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INTRODUCTION
There has been a dramatic recent resurgence of strike activity in the United
States. From auto plants to supermarkets to public schools to fast food outlets,
workers around the country have recognized the fundamental importance of
strikes—in economic, political, and dignitary terms.1 Still, judges and legal
scholars have had a difficult time establishing that the right to strike, which exists
at a statutory level with substantial qualifications, should receive constitutional
recognition. There have been isolated instances2 or hints3 of judicial support, as
well as scholarly contentions that the right may exist in some dormant form.4 But
arguments to federal courts have regularly come up short, whether based on
withholding labor as a due process liberty right;5 as resisting involuntary
servitude;6 or as engaging collectively in freedom of association.7 While high
profile strikes have become more visible around the world as well as in this
country,8 labor law scholars have acknowledged, at times reluctantly, that the
right to strike is not protected under well-settled U.S. constitutional standards.9
1. See Neal E. Boudette, G.M. Workers Approve Contract and End U.A.W. Strike, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2019); Sandra E. Garcia, Stop & Shop Strike Ends With Union Claiming Victory on Pay and
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2019); Brendon O’Brien, After 11 Days, Chicago Teachers Strike to
End as Union, Mayor Reach Deal,REUTERS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-
education/after-11-days-chicago-teachers-strike-to-end-as-union-mayor-reach-deal-idUSKBN1XA12Y;
Zachary B. Wolf, Why Teacher Strikes are Touching Every Part of America, CNN (Feb. 23, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/23/politics/teacher-strikes-politics/index.html; Andrew Van Dam,
Teacher Strikes Made 2018 the Biggest Year for Worker Protest in a Generation, WASH. POST (Feb.14,
2019); Noam Scheiber, In a Strong Economy, Why Are So Many Workers on Strike? N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2019). See generally Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 47-51 (2016).
2. See, e.g., County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 of LA County v. Local Service Employees Int’l
Union, 699 P.2d 835, 848-54 (Cal. 1985); id. at 855-66 (Bird, C.J. concurring); United Federation of
Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879, 885 (D.D.C. 1971) (Skelly Wright, J., concurring).
3. See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 366-67 (1988); American Federation of
Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 557-59 (1949) (Rutledge J. concurring).
4. See, e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First Amendment: Past as
Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2076-89 (2018); Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right
to Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 513, 525-27 (2017).
5. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926); Int’l Union UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245, 249 (1949).
6. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 74 Carpenters, 181 F.2d 126, 132 (6th Cir. 1950), aff’d mem. 340
U.S. 962 (1950).
7. See, e.g., Lyng v. Int’l Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 362-70 (1988); see also FTC v. Superior
Court Trial Lawyers Assn., 493 U.S. 411, 425-32 (1990) (lawyers’ boycott as court-appointed counsel for
indigent defendants not protected from antitrust regulation under First Amendment).
8. For recent high-profile U.S. strikes, see supra note 1. For strikes elsewhere, see, e.g., Simran
Jain, Neoliberalism and the Dignity of Labor in the Indian Automobile Industry: A Case Study of the Bajaj
Auto Strike, Pune, 70 LABOR L.J. 193-201 (2019) (2013 India automobile industry strike); Magdalena
Kučko, The Decision of TUIfly: Are the Ryanair Strikes to Be Seen as Extraordinary Circumstances, 44
AIR & SPACE L. 321 (2019) (2018 Ryanair strike); Samuel Andreas Admasie, Amid Political
Recalibrations: Strike Wave Hits Ethiopia, 21 J. LABOR & SOCIETY 431-435 (2018) (series of strikes in
Ethiopia beginning in 2017); Mark Anner &Xiangmin Liu,Harmonious Unions and Rebellious Workers:
A Study of Wildcat Strikes in Vietnam, 69 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 23-25 (2016) (study of Vietnam
strikes, 2010-12, concluding inter alia that “strikes have become an important part of the political and
economic landscape in Vietnam”).
9. See, e.g., James Gray Pope, How American Workers Lost the Right to Strike, and Other
Tales, 103 MICH. L. REV. 518, 527-34 (2004); Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4
VAND. L. REV. 574, 575-91 (1951). See generally James B. Atleson, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 7, 24-25 (1983); Alan Bogg & Cynthia Estlund, The Right to Strike and
Contestatory Citizenship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LABOUR LAW (Hugh Collins et. al. eds.,
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This Article pursues a different path. Using international labor and human
rights doctrine, it analyzes the right to strike as an integral element of freedom
of association among workers, and concludes that this right has achieved the
status of customary international law (CIL). It then explores possible ways to
incorporate such an international right in the U.S. context, recognizing certain
very real jurisdictional and remedial challenges.
Recourse to international law sources has garnered support from several
current and recent justices,10 but the tide may be ebbing. Given evidence of
contemporary Supreme Court reluctance to accept developments in international
human rights law asserted by foreign nationals as U.S. federal law,11 or to refer
to foreign constitutions when interpreting federal constitutional rights,12 the
arguments developed here may be discounted by some readers as more of an
aspiration than a practical possibility. There are several reasons, however, to look
past this position.
For a start, establishing the right to strike as CIL is an important
development in itself, beyond as well as within the U.S. judicial context. Because
CIL has long been an incorporated source of English common law upon which
courts may draw as required,13 the international right to strike may be applicable
in British and related common law settings. Moreover, state courts have invoked
2018); Andrias, supra note 1, at 17-18.
10. See generally Stephen McCaffrey, There’s a Whole World Out There: Justice Kennedy’s
Use of International Sources, 44 MCGEORGE L REV 201 (2013); Susan H. Farbstein, Justice Ginsburg’s
International Perspective, in ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JUSTICE RUTH BADER GINSBURG (2013) (on file with
Harvard Law School); Stephen Breyer, America’s Courts Can’t Ignore the World, THE ATLANTIC (Oct.
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/10/stephen-breyer-supreme-court-world/568
360/.
11. See, e.g., Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC., 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018) (declining to extend liability
under Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to foreign corporations); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S.
108 (2013) (holding ATS inapplicable to violations of law of nations occurring within territory of a foreign
sovereign); See also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (holding that International Court of Justice
decision requiring notice to certain foreign nationals was not enforceable domestic federal law); Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 341, 352-54 (2006) (holding that the Supreme Court could not impose a
remedy in response to violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations); Flomo v. Firestone
Natural Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1023 (7th Cir. 2011). See generally Martin S. Flaherty,
RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY 167-73 (2019) (describing how Supreme Court in recent decades has
used justiciability factors such as standing and political question, and additional considerations including
extraterritoriality and state secrets privilege, to keep foreign affairs controversies out of federal court); id.
at 233-40 (discussing application of these constraints with specific reference to international human rights
norms); Thomas H. Lee, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. JUDICIAL POWER: FROM THE
THIRD TO THE FOURTH RESTATEMENTS (2020) (describing shift in Restatement of foreign relations law:
from encouraging use of U.S. judicial power to advance the customary international law of human rights
to discouraging such use and seeking to constrain judicial reliance on the customary international law of
human rights).
12. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997); see generallyMark V. Tushnet,
Referring to Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation: An Episode in the Culture Wars, 35 U. BALT.
L. REV. 299 (2006) (describing the limited use of international and foreign law in Supreme Court
opinions).
13. See, e.g., R. v. Jones [2007] 1 AC 136, 155 (Lord Bingham); Trendtex Trading Corp. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 554 (Lord Denning). See generally James Crawford,
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 67-71 (8th ed. 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE’S
PRINCIPLES]. See also Nevsun Resources Ltd v. Araya, 2020 SCC 5 (Canadian Supreme Court holds that
CILmay apply as Canadian common law to remedy alleged forced labor violations by Canadian company
in Eritrea).
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CIL when relevant to resolving disputes under their own laws,14 and they may
choose to apply this international right to reconsider the restrictions imposed on
strikes under state statutes. Additionally, worker movements in this country may
make use of CIL as part of their vocabulary to defend the legality of strikes
outside the courtroom.15
Although the Supreme Court as currently constituted appears skeptical of
CIL applications in a foreign affairs context, it has considered international
human rights law relevant to domestic legal challenges in relatively recent
times.16 In this regard, commentators and judges have long invoked CIL or its
antecedent “law of nations” in aspirational as well as pragmatic terms. On
diverse matters such as slave trading and slavery, reasonable and proportionate
forms of criminal punishment, and the right to a healthy environment,
international human rights doctrine has been deemed applicable even when U.S.
laws and courts seemed inhospitable to recognizing relevant legal protections.17
In what follows, the Article addresses four distinct questions. The first
question involves the contents and contours of the right to strike as recognized
under international instruments. The international right is embedded within two
widely endorsed United Nations human rights treaties,18 and was recently
reaffirmed by the human rights committees responsible for monitoring
14. State courts applied CIL for many decades before Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64
(1938) in ways that rarely diverged from federal courts. See Julian G. Ku, Customary International Law
in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 265, 311-32 (2001). Since Erie, they have continued to construe state
law so as to be consistent with CIL as federal common law. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. New York,
250 N.E. 2d 698, 700 (NY 1969); In re Caravas’ Estate, 250 P.2d 593, 596-97 (Cal. 1952); Peters v.
McKay, 238 P.2d 225, 230-32, 239-40 (Ore. 1951).
15. In states that prohibit public employee strikes, teachers have justified recent walkouts as a
form of political speech directed at lawmakers, or as a “work action” rather than a strike. SeeMark Walsh,
Are Teacher Strikes Illegal? Depends Where You Are and Who You Ask, EDUCATION WEEK (May 8,
2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/05/09/legalities-and-politics-collide-in-teacher-work.
html; Kate Cimini, Teacher Strikes Are Illegal in West Virginia . . . So How Do They Strike? MEDILL
NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 8, 2018), https://dc.medill.northwestern.edu/blog/2018/03/08/67017/#sthash.foE9
hx44.dpbs.
16. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 80-82 (2010) (invoking the laws and practices of other
nations as confirmatory support for conclusion that imposing life-without-parole sentences on juveniles
violates Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005) (relying on decades-long
practice of looking to other countries and international authorities as “instructive for its interpretation of”
the Eighth Amendment, in concluding that imposing death sentence for juveniles constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment).
17. See Jenny S. Martinez, THE SLAVE TRADE AND THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 63-65 (2012) (discussing positions of Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.)
66, 121 (1825) and James Kent in COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826) that transatlantic slave
trade—while morally repugnant—was not unlawful under the law of nations; id. at 115 (discussing
identification of the slave trade as a “crime against humanity” by international legal scholar Henry
Wheaton in 1842, and again in Wheaton’s HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS in 1845); Steven G.
Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred
Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 743, 867, 908
(2005); John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined Human Right to a Healthy
Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 283 (2000). See
also Katie Hatziavramidis, Parental Involvement Laws for Abortion in the United States and the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Can International Law Secure the Right to Choose for
Minors? 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.185 (2007).
18. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 8(1)(d), 8(2),
Dec. 16, 1996, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 22(1), 22(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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implementation of those treaties19 It is set forth in more precise and detailed
terms pursuant to Convention 87 of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
addressing freedom of association (FOA), and the interpretations given to that
convention by ILO supervisory bodies. Notwithstanding recent objections from
employers’ groups, the right is recognized by the overwhelming majority of
governments that have ratified Convention 87 as being an integral part of the
Convention. In this regard, there is an established ILO jurisprudence on the right
to strike, developed by two of its key supervisory committees—the independent
Committee of Experts (CEACR), and the tripartite Committee on Freedom of
Association (CFA),20 and reinforced by observations from the two UN human
rights committees.21
The Article summarizes this jurisprudence and describes how protections
for the international right exceed U.S. protections for the right to strike in two
key areas. The international law prohibition on private employers’ ability to
permanently replace lawfully striking workers conflicts with Supreme Court
precedent construing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).22 And the
international law protection for public employee strikes with only limited
exceptions conflicts with the NLRA’s allowing states to prohibit all strikes by
their employees. At the same time, the international right is hardly untethered: it
includes a range of exceptions and limitations that constrain its scope in certain
ways when compared with U.S. statutory law.
The second question is whether this international right to strike qualifies
as CIL. The Article contends that it does, based on the existence of widespread
State practice in which ratification or conformity reflects opinio juris, a genuine
sense of obligation under international law. In addition to Convention 87 having
been ratified by more than 80 percent of ILO Member States, the right to strike
as an integral part of FOA is an element in broader ILO documents that obligate
all countries, including those like the U.S. that have not ratified the
Convention.23 Relatedly, the right is recognized through the two previously
mentioned U.N. Covenants whose language expressly incorporates the
19. See Joint Statement by the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the
Human Rights Committee, Freedom of Association, Including the Right to Form and Join Trade Unions,
para. 4 (Oct. 23, 2019).
20. See CEACR, GIVING GLOBALIZATION A HUMAN FACE 46-65 (2012) [hereinafter 2012
GENERAL SURVEY]; CEACR, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 161-78 (1994)
[hereinafter 1994 GENERAL SURVEY]; CFA, COMPILATION OF DECISIONS 143-82 (sixth ed., 2018)
[hereinafter 2018 COMPILATION]; CFA, DIGEST OF DECISIONS 109-36 (5th ed., 2006) [hereinafter 2006
DIGEST].
21. See Diane F. Frey, Conflict over Conflict: The Right to Strike in International Law, 8
GLOBAL LAB. J. 17, 20-23 (2017) (citing sources).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
23. See ILO Constitution, Oct. 9, 1946, 15 U.N.T.S. 35 (the Constitution governs operation of
the different ILO bodies, the functioning of the International Labor Conference, and the adoption and
application of international labor standards; it was originally part of the Treaty of Versailles (1919), and
has been amended on several occasions, most notably in 1944 through the Declaration of Philadelphia);
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 19, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1237 (1998)
[1998 Declaration] (the Declaration commits Member States to respect and promote principles and rights
in four categories, whether or not they have ratified the relevant Conventions; the categories are freedom
of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced
or compulsory labor, the abolition of child labor and the elimination of employment discrimination).
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guarantees provided for in Convention 87. The right is further established in
prominent decisions from transnational courts, and in domestic legal frameworks
around the world (constitutions, statutes, and high court decisions), reinforcing
the argument that widespread respect from governments is based on a sense of
legal obligation. Further, the broad-based evidence from domestic legal
frameworks indicates that ratification reflects not simply formal commitment but
active compliance by governments.
Application of the international right to strike recognizes variations in
nationally-specific approaches. However, the two key areas in which U.S. law
deviates from the international right—approving permanent replacements for
lawful strikers and allowing the prohibition of all public employee strikes—are
central elements of the right itself, rather than more marginal aspects subject to
national circumstances. Finally, notwithstanding that U.S. statutory protections
for strikes deviate from international standards in these two areas, respect for the
international right is reflected in legislation enacted by Congress in recent
decades, and by executive action indicating the express understanding of the
Obama and Trump Administrations that the right to strike is an integral part of
FOA.24
The third question is how this CIL interacts with other forms of law in a
U.S. domestic setting. Accepting that the right to strike as a CIL norm is
appropriately specific and universal,25 U.S. workers asserting such a right would
be seeking direct application of CIL, stemming from legal principles set forth in
The Paquete Habana26 and subsequent cases. The Article considers two potential
impediments in the relationship between CIL and other forms of domestic law.
One is whether U.S. courts should determine matters of CIL as federal common
law or as state law in light of the Erie doctrine.27 Without revisiting the extensive
debates on this issue, the Article briefly explains why a CIL right to strike should
be accepted as federal common law. The other impediment is whether any
applicable treaty or controlling executive, legislative, or judicial act precludes
federal courts from recognizing a right to strike as CIL.28 While acknowledging
24. For Congress, see 1984 Trade and Tariff Act and 2002 Trade Act. For executive action, see
ILO, Final Report of the Tripartite Meeting on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), in relation to the right to strike and the modalities and practices of
strike action at national level (Geneva, February 23-25), para. 16, GB.323/INS/5/Appendix II (Mar. 13,
2015) [hereinafter 2015 Final Report]. See also United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, art. 23,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-
agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter USMCA]. These positions taken by Congress and the
Executive are discussed infra Part II.E.2.
25. This by virtue of its being established as CIL of comparable quality to the norms recognized
in international law at the time of the framing. See generally Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732
(2004), discussed in infra Part II.E.3; John O. McGinnis, Sosa and the Derivation of Customary
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
(Sloss, Ramsey & Dodge eds., 2011) 481, 481-82.
26. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
27. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modernist Position, 111 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh,
Commentary: Is International Law Really State Law? 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998).
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. See generally Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446
(11th Cir. 1986); Agora: May the President Violate Customary International Law? 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913
(1986).
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cogent arguments in support of a “controlling domestic law” position, the Article
contends there is no such controlling prohibition under positive law. Some
elements of domestic law are inconsistent with the contours of the international
right to strike, but they are not “controlling” in the relevant sense of addressing
or responding to developments in CIL, given that the CIL has arisen and become
established subsequent to those elements.
The fourth and final question is whether there is a cause of action that
courts can recognize even if Congress has not done so. The Article proposes an
equitable cause of action to enforce a right as defined by CIL. This action is
analogous to modern cases recognizing private parties’ right to challenge the
statutorily-grounded actions of federal agencies or officials through non-
statutory review.29 The most likely federal cause of action is against the federal
government, seeking declaratory or injunctive relief to ensure the removal of
certain domestic law obstacles to the CIL right to strike—obstacles that arise
pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act.30
This final part discusses the two leading domestic law obstacles: private
employers’ right to hire permanent replacements for economic strikers, and the
banning of strikes by all public employees under multiple state laws. In
addressing the permanent replacement doctrine applied by private employers,
the Article advances a role for the Charming Betsy canon: where legislation is
ambiguous, it should be interpreted to conform to international law.31 In
addressing the prohibition on all public employee strikes enacted by many states,
the Article suggests that the more recently generated CIL constraint on such
blanket prohibitions should be viewed as prevailing federal law in light of the
Supreme Court decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority.32 In addition, state courts in jurisdictions that ban all public employee
strikes may decide to apply CIL as federal precedent that can help reshape or
influence their own legal regime on the right to strike.
The Article pursues the four sets of questions set forth above in the four
parts that follow this Introduction. The first and second questions, addressed in
greater depth, allow for relatively clear responses in an international law context.
The third and fourth questions involve contested aspects of CIL recognition and
implied rights of action in the U.S. setting. These areas of contestation raise
jurisdictional, procedural, and prudential uncertainties regarding how federal
courts might assess the right to strike under CIL as a matter of domestic law.
29. See, e.g., Mittelman v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 757 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2014);
Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322,
1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
30. In seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as opposed to damages, it is not necessary to
address the Court’s increasing reluctance to recognize implied causes of action for damages against the
federal government. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S.Ct. 1843 (2017) (discussing opposition to implying new
forms of damages actions based on Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
31. SeeMurray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804); Guaylupo-Moya
v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2005)
32. Garcia v. San AntonioMetro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). As explained in infra Part
III.C, although this CIL may be superseded by federal statute—generated through the political leverage
exercised by state and local governments as contemplated by the Court in Garcia—it remains controlling
federal law unless and until Congress takes such legislative action.
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I. THE RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Strikes are an essential means available to workers and their organizations
to protect their interests. Although the taking of strike action is a basic right, a
strike is not pursued for its own sake. Rather, it is a last resort for workers and
their organizations, one that typically follows unsuccessful and contentious
negotiations. Strikes carry serious consequences for employers, for workers and
their families, and in many circumstances for third parties.
A. Recognition of the Right to Strike
Convention 87, addressing freedom of association and protection of the
right to organize,33 was promulgated by the ILO in 1948. Unlike other U.N.
specialized agencies, the ILO has a tripartite governing structure. Each of the
187 Member States is represented not only by governments but also by
organizations of employers and of workers (referred to as “social partners”).
Their right of participation as representatives includes the right to vote; the
standard ratio of representation is 2:1:1, or two government, one employer, and
one worker.34
In the absence of an express provision on strikes in Convention 87, two
leading ILO supervisory bodies have developed over many decades recognition
for the right to strike as an essential component of FOA. The independent
CEACR was established in 1926; it is charged with making impartial
observations that address questions or concerns regarding a country’s progress
toward compliance with ratified conventions in law and practice.35 The tripartite
CFA was established in 1951, based on recognition that the principles of FOA
and the rights to organize and engage in collective bargaining required a
dedicated supervisory procedure to monitor compliance even in countries that
had not ratified Conventions 87 and 98.36
33. SeeConvention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise
(No. 87), July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 [hereinafter Convention 87].
34. See ILO Constitution, supra note 23, art. 3. Each of the 187 member states at the
International Labor Conference has four member delegates. The Conference, which is a parliamentary-
type organization, meets at least once every year—typically in June—to develop and adopt labor standards
and recommendations and to approve other policies involving the ILO program and budget. The ILO
Governing Body meets more often during the year to set the agenda and draft a program and budget for
submission to the Conference. It is composed of twenty-eight government representatives, fourteen
employer representatives, and fourteen worker representatives. See id. art. 7.
35. The CEACR is composed of twenty individuals appointed by the ILO Governing Body for
up to five three-year terms. The Experts are judges, practitioners, legal academics, and human rights
specialists with legal expertise at the national and international levels. They come from different
geographic regions, legal systems, and cultures. Their role is to provide an impartial and technical
evaluation of the application of international labor standards, in response to periodic reports filed by
governments on the conventions they have ratified. See Application of International Labour Standards
2019 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part A), at 2 (describing terms of appointment); id. at 12
(presenting Mandate of the Committee). Reporting cycles vary for different types of conventions. The
current reporting cycle is three years for fundamental conventions, such as Convention 87, and six years
for technical conventions, such as those involving safety and health or social security. In cases where
serious compliance issues have arisen, the CEACR may request interim reports in a shorter time frame.
36. Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and
Bargain Collectively (No. 98), July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 [hereinafter Convention 98]. Convention 98
addressed to collective bargaining, was promulgated in 1949. Unlike the CEACR, the CFA issues
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The right to strike and numerous principles relating to that right derive
mainly through application of Article 3 of the Convention, which sets out the
right of workers organizations to organize their activities and to formulate their
programs,37 and Article 10, under which the objective of these organizations is
to further and defend the interests of workers.38 Decisions by the CFA
recognizing a right to strike date from 1952, and observations by the CEACR
recognizing the right began in 1959.39 The right has been amplified in
explanatory terms through General Surveys addressing FOA issued by the
CEACR, most recently in 1994 and 2012,40 and through indexed compilations
of CFA decisions, including one last issued in 2018.41
The position of these two supervisory bodies, recognizing and protecting
the right to strike as an intrinsic element of the right of association under the
Convention, has in more recent times been criticized by employer organizations
in the context of a third ILO supervisory body—the Committee on the
Application of Standards (CAS) of the International Labor Conference.42 The
decisions in response to outside complaints brought against a member state by employers’ or workers’
organizations, regardless of whether the member state has ratified Conventions 87 or 98. If the CFA finds
there has been a violation of freedom of association standards or principles, it issues a report through the
Governing Body, makes recommendations on how the situation can be remedied, and requests a report
from the government on implementation of its recommendations. In cases where the country has ratified
the relevant conventions, the CFA may refer legislative aspects of the case to the CEACR.
37. Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 3 (“1. Workers’ and employers’ organisations shall have
the right to draw up their constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organise
their administration and activities and to formulate their programmes. 2. The public authorities shall
refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful exercise thereof.”).
38. Convention 87, supra note 33, art.10 (“In this Convention the term organisationmeans any
organisation of workers or of employers for furthering and defending the interests of workers or of
employers”) (emphasis in original).
39. The CFA held that “the right to strike and that of organising union meetings are essential
elements of trade union rights.” ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report No. 2 (1952), Case
No. 28 (UK–Jamaica), para 68. A few years later, the CFA asserted its competence to address “allegations
relating to prohibitions to the right to strike,” adding that “the right . . . to strike as a legitimate means of
defence of [workers’] occupational interests is generally recognized.” ILO Committee on Freedom of
Association, Report No. 27 (1958), Case No. 163 (Burma), para 51. The CEACR, in its first General
Survey, found that “the prohibition of strikes by workers other than public officials acting in the name of
public powers . . . may sometimes constitute a considerable restriction of the potential activities of trade
unions,” and that prohibitions on the right to strike are inconsistent with specific articles of Convention
87. ILO, 42d Session, Report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
(1959), Part 1, Report III, pp.114-15. These 1950s sources are discussed in detail in Jeffrey S. Vogt, The
Right to Strike and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 27 KING’S L.J. 110, 113-14, 116 (2016).
See generally 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 46, 48.
40. See discussion of Right to Strike by CEACR in 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at
46-65; 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 61-78. Pursuant to Article 19 of the ILO Constitution–
–requiring member States to report at the Governing Body’s request on their law and practice with respect
to unratified as well as ratified Conventions—the CEACR publishes an in-depth annual General Survey
on member States’ national law and practice, regarding a subject chosen by the Governing Body. ILO
Constitution, supra note 23, art. 19. These General Surveys, based on information requested from all
member states, allow the CEACR to examine the impact of conventions, to analyze the challenges
identified by governments as impeding their application or ratification, and to identify possible means for
overcoming the challenges.
41. See discussion of right to strike by CFA in 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 143-182;
2006 DIGEST, supra note 20, at 109-136.
42. The CAS was established in 1926 along with the CEACR, but operates on a tripartite basis
like the CFA. In addition to other activities, the CAS each year selects approximately 25 CEACR
observations reflecting especially serious instances of noncompliance for full discussion before the
International Labor Conference (the ILO parliament), and invites the non-complying governments to
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employers’ critique contends that principles regulating in detail the right to strike
are grounded in neither the preparatory work for Convention 87 nor an
interpretation based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.43 The
workers’ group within the CAS has rejected this critique, and the governments—
the third element of tripartite authority under the ILO Constitution44—have sided
with the workers in agreeing that a right to strike is protected under the text and
purpose of Convention 87,45 while also agreeing that the right is neither absolute
nor unlimited.46
Recognition of the right to strike as fundamental by two key ILO
supervisory bodies is reinforced by affirmation of the right within a broad
framework of international covenants, transnational conventions and judicial
decisions, and national constitutions. The right to strike is recognized in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the United
Nations (ICESCR).47 It has been incorporated into the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by that Covenant’s Human Rights
Committee, which supervises the Covenant’s implementation.48 Although these
appear and explain their implementation efforts. Following these discussions, a form of soft-law
“shaming,” the CAS issues conclusions on behalf of the full ILO membership, recommending or urging
governments to take specific steps to remedy their problems. Since the 1990s, employer members of the
CAS have objected to the CEACR and CFA determinations that a right to strike is part of Convention 87;
those objections became more strenuous in 2012. See Claire La Hovary, Showdown at the ILO? A
Historical Perspective on the Employers’ Group’s 2012 Challenge to the Right to Strike, 42 INDUS. L.J.
338 (2013).
43. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 47 (summarizing employers’ group position
at the CAS); Letter of 29 August 2017 to CEACR from International Organization of Employers
(expressing continuing disagreement with CEACR position on the right to strike under Convention 87),
available at: https://www.ioe-emp.org/index.php?eID=dumpFile&t=f&f=134809&token=99f70e1f1a898
4f13d6e524d129ab23025f9406fab23025f9406f.
44. See supra text accompanying note 34.
45. See 2015 Final Report, supra note 24, at 4-7, 13-14 (statements from governments of Latvia
on behalf of the European Union, United States, Germany, India, Mexico, Italy, Panama, Argentina,
Venezuela, Norway, Angola, Colombia).
46. See id. Given the role of the CEACR as an ILO supervisory mechanism, enforceable
regulation of strike action takes place at the national level rather than through the CEACR, whose
“opinions and recommendations are non-binding, being intended to guide the actions of national
authorities.” CEACRMandate quoted in 2019 CEACR Report, supra note 35, at 12, para. 32. At the same
time, the CEACR’s expertise and authority are well recognized “by virtue of its composition,
independence, and its working methods built on continuing dialogue with governments taking into
account information provided by employers’ and workers’ organizations. This has been reflected in the
incorporation of the Committee’s opinions and recommendations in national legislation, international
instruments and court decisions.” Id.
Although the employers’ objections have not altered the positions taken by the CEACR,
CFA, or governments recognizing and applying the international right to strike in national settings, the
dispute within the CAS based on their objections persists. In order to accommodate the employers’ view
and allow the CAS to function as a consensus-based body when identifying the 25 most egregious
instances of non-compliance (see supra note 42), those 25 cases in recent years have not included
discussions related to possible failures to comply with protections for the right to strike under Convention
87.
47. See ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 8(1)(d). A total of 170 countries have ratified the ICESCR.
Status of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY
COLLECTION https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter=
4&clang=_en. The U.S. has signed but not ratified the Covenant. See MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS
DEVELOPMENT 227 (1995); Frey, supra note 21, at 20-21.
48. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 22 on FOA, which is silent on the right to strike. A total of
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two treaties are more familiar starting points for international human rights
analysis than the ILO Conventions, the Article focuses primarily on the
Convention 87 applications because of their extensive in-depth nature. In this
regard, it is notable that the two U.N. Covenants declare a specific commitment
to Convention 87, which is the only other international convention they even
mention, and the two treaty bodies regularly apply their relevant articles in terms
that are consistent with ILO application of that convention.49
The right to strike is also recognized in a number of regional instruments
such as the Charter of the Organization of American States;50 the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union;51 and the Arab Charter on Human
Rights.52 Protection of the right is perhaps most fully developed in regional terms
at the European level. Decisions by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) affirm that the right to strike is protected under Article 11(1) of the
European Convention of Human Rights, citing to CEACR and CFA judgments
for support.53 And at a national level, more than 90 countries recognize the right
to strike in constitutional terms.54 Notable national court decisions affirming the
173 countries have ratified the ICCPR, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_
no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en , though some like the U.S. with reservations. Since 1999, the
Covenant’s Human Rights Committee has protected the right to strike as part of FOA and monitored
States’ conduct in this regard. See Patrick Macklem, The Right to Bargain Collectively in International
Law: Workers’ Right, Human Right, International Right?, in LABOUR RIGHTS ASHUMAN RIGHTS (Philip
Alston ed., 2005) 72-73. Although the U.S. attached a number of reservations to the ICCPR when it
ratified in 1992, none relate to the recognition of Convention 87 or the right to strike.
49. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 22.3, and ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 8.3 (stating in identical
language that nothing in the labor articles of the covenants authorizes States “to take legislative measures
which would prejudice, or apply the law in such a manner as would prejudice, the guarantees provided
for in” Convention 87); B. Saul, D. Kinley & J. Mowbray, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: COMMENTARY, CASES AND MATERIALS 579-86 (2014)
(tracing the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights interpretations of the right to strike as
cognizant of and congruent with CEACR Observations and CFA decisions). See also infra note 62
(summarizing one such interpretation).
50. See Charter of the Organization of American States, art. 45(c), Apr. 30, 1948, 199 U.N.T.S.
3 (1993).
51. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 28, Dec. 7, 2000, 40 I.L.M.
266.
52. See Arab Charter on Human Rights, art. 35(3). Sept. 15, 1994, reprinted in HRLJ 18 (1997)
151.
53. For recent examples, see Ognevenko v Russia App No. 44873/09 (20 November 2018);
RMT v. UK, Application No. 31045/10, 8 April 2014; Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, Third Section, 21
April 2009, Application No. 34503/97. See also Demir and Baykara v Turkey [2008] ECHR 1345
(affirming fundamental right of civil servants to engage in collective bargaining and take collective action
to that end). While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in 2007 that the right to strike should be
exercised proportionately in settings implicating certain business freedoms, the court expressly stated that
the right to strike is recognized under Convention 87 and held it to be a fundamental right within European
Community Law. See A.C.L. Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases
in the ECJ, 37 IND. L. J. 126 (2008). The 155 ILO member states that have ratified Convention 87 include
every European country, and subsequent ECHR decisions cited in this footnote have reaffirmed the
strength of the right to strike while invoking mainstream ILO jurisprudence set forth by the CEACR and
CFA. See Tonia Novitz,Multi-level Disputes Relating to Freedom of Association and the Right to Strike:
Transnational Systems, Actors and Resources, at 12-14, forthcoming 36 (4) INT’L J. COMP. LAB. L. &
INDUS. REL. (2020) (copy on file with author).
54. See Jeffrey S. Vogt, Janice R. Bellace et al., THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
167-180 (2020) (reproducing language from constitutions in 92 countries recognizing a right to strike).
Recent examples includeMorocco (2011), Kenya (2010), and Ecuador (2008). For additional support, see
2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 50, n.264, listing 92 ILO member countries recognizing the
right to strike in constitutional or other terms based on their reports to the ILO. Some omissions have been
12 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46: 1
existence of this right as constitutionally imbedded, based in part on ILO norms,
have come from the Canadian Supreme Court, the South African Constitutional
Court, and the Spanish Constitutional Court.55
While these additional legal sources amplify the existence and nature of an
international right to strike, the right has drawn its principal contours from
Convention 87 as applied and interpreted by the CEACR and CFA, reinforced
by applications under the ICESCR and the ICCPR. Since 2002, national courts
in at least eleven countries on four continents have applied the international right
to strike to their domestic legal frameworks by referring to interpretations from
the CEACR and/or the CFA.56 In what follows, the Article draws on those
interpretations to discuss certain recognized limitations on the right to strike, and
also some aspects of its broader scope under FOA principles.
B. Substantive and Procedural Limitations on the Right to Strike
The international right to strike is far from absolute. It may be restricted in
exceptional circumstances, or even prohibited, pursuant to national regulation.
For a start, Convention 87 provides that members of the armed forces and the
police may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, including
the right to strike.57 In addition, applications by the CFA and CEACR have
concluded that three distinct forms of substantive restriction on the right to strike
are compatible with Convention 87.
1. Substantive Limitations
One important restriction applies to certain categories of public servants.
The CEACR and CFA have made clear that public employees generally enjoy
the same right to strike as their counterparts in the private sector; at the same
time, in order to ensure continuity of functions in the three branches of
government, this right may be restricted for public servants exercising authority
in the name of the State.58 Examples include officials performing tasks that
involve the administration of necessary executive branch functions or that relate
added since 2012 (for instance, Canada).
55. See Saskatchewan Fed. of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] 1SCR 245; NUMSA (Natl U of
Metalworkers of SA) v. Bader Pop, 13/12/2002, Case No. CCT 14/02; Decision 11/1981 Constitutional
Court of Spain, Second Chamber, Case No. 38/1981; Vogt et al, supra note 54, at 136, 171-73.
56. See Compendium of Court Decisions, ITCILO, http://compendium.itcilo.org/en/decisions-
by-subject for decisions from Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, Kenya, Nigeria,
Peru, Senegal, and South Africa. The compendium of decisions is not assembled on a comprehensive or
systemic basis. It reflects submissions to the ILO from interested advocates or parties around the world.
European countries are not among the eleven countries listed, perhaps because the European Court of
Human Rights has regularly held in favor of an international right to strike, citing to ILO sources; see
supra note 53 and accompanying text.
57. Article 9 provides in relevant part as follows: “The extent to which the guarantees provided
for in this Convention shall apply to the armed forces and the police shall be determined by national laws
or regulations.” Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 9. The same language appears in Article 5 of
Convention 98, addressing the right to organize and engage in collective bargaining.
58. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 52, para. 129; 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra
note 20, at 69, para. 158 (citing also same formulation in General Surveys of 1959, 1973, 1983); 2018
COMPILATION, supra note 20, 154, para. 828; 2006 DIGEST, supra note 20, at 118, para. 574.
2021] The Right to Strike as Customary International Law 13
to the administration of justice.
Each country has its own approach to classifying public servants exercising
authority in the name of the State. When considering the international right under
Convention 87, some public servant exceptions seem clearly applicable, such as
officials auditing or collecting internal revenues, customs officers, or judges and
their close judicial assistants.59 Some public servant exceptions seem
inapplicable, such as teachers, or public servants in State-owned commercial
enterprises.60 Whether public servants are exercising authority in the name of the
State can be a close question under particular national law, one on which the
CEACR and CFA have offered encouragement and guidance,61 as has the
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).62
A second equally important restriction on the right to strike involves
essential services in the strict sense of the term. This is an area in which both the
CEACR and CFA have developed a detailed set of applications and guidelines.63
The two committees consider that essential services, for the purposes of
restricting or prohibiting the right to strike, are only those “the interruption of
which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of
the population.”64
This definition of essential services “in the strict sense of the term” stems
from the idea that “essential services” as a limitation on the right to strike would
lose its meaning if statutes or judicial decisions defined those services in too
broad a manner.65 The interruption of services that cause or have the potential to
cause economic hardships—even serious economic hardships—is not ordinarily
59. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 155, paras. 832, 833, 834.
60. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 52, para. 130 (teachers should benefit from
right to strike although under certain circumstances maintenance of minimum service levels may be
envisaged); 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 155, para. 831 (public servants in State-owned
commercial enterprises should have right to strike subject to essential services qualifier). See also id. at
159, para. 842 (citing more than 10 cases identifying education sector as not an essential service).
61. See, e.g., Application of International Labour Standards 2018 (I), Report of the CEACR,
Report III (Part A), at 114 (reflecting extended dialogue with government of Japan); Application of
International Labour Standards 2012 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part 1A), at 217 (describing
responsiveness from Government of Panama); CFA Case No. 1865, Report No. 340, paras. 751, 781
(describing modest legislative progress in South Korea, 2006).
62. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Consideration of reports
submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding observations of
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany 2001, para. 14, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1/Add.68 (Sept. 24, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 CESCR Report] (“The Committee reiterates its
concern, in line with the Human Rights Committee [of the ICCPR] and the ILO Committee of Experts,
that the prohibition by the State party of strikes by public servants [other than those performing essential
services] constitutes a restriction of the activities of trade unions that is beyond the scope of Article 8(2)
of the Covenant. The Committee disagrees with the State party’s statement that ‘a strike would be
incompatible with th[e] duty of loyalty and would run counter to the purpose of a professional civil
service,’ as this interpretation of ‘the administration of the State’ mentioned in Article 8(2) of the
Covenant exceeds the more restrictive interpretations by the Committee, the ILO and the European Court
of Justice.”).
63. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 53-55; 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20,
at 156-61, paras. 836-52.
64. 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 53, para.131 (citing 1994 GENERAL SURVEY,
supra note 20, at 70, para. 159); 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 156, paras. 836, 838.
65. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 156, para. 838; 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra
note 20, at 70, para. 159. See also 2001 CESCR Report, supra note 62.
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sufficient to qualify the interrupted service as essential. Indeed, the very purpose
of a strike is to interrupt services or production and thereby cause a degree of
economic hardship. That is the leverage workers can exercise; it is what allows
a strike to be effective in bringing the parties to the table and securing a
negotiated settlement.
The two ILO supervisory committees also have made clear that the
essential services concept is not static in nature. Thus, a non-essential service
may become essential if the strike exceeds a certain duration or extent, or as a
function of the special characteristics of a country.66 One example is that of an
island State where at some point ferry transportation services become essential
to bring food and medical supplies to the population.67
When examining concrete cases, the supervisory bodies have considered a
range of services, both public and private, too broad to summarize here. As
illustrative, the two bodies have determined that essential services in the strict
sense of the term include air traffic control services,68 telephone services,69
prison services, firefighting services, and water and electricity services.70 The
CEACR and CFA also have identified a range of services that presumptively are
deemed not to be essential in the strict sense of the term.71
In addition, in circumstances where a total prohibition on the right to strike
is not appropriate, the magnitude of impact on the basic needs of consumers or
the general public, or the need for safe operation of facilities, may justify
introduction of a negotiated minimum service.72 Such a service, however, must
truly be a minimum service, that is one limited to meeting the basic needs of the
population or the minimum requirements of the service, while maintaining the
effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear through the strike by a majority of
workers.73
66. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 53, para. 131 (discussing characteristics of
an island State); 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 161, para. 851 (discussing effects on elderly
pensioners of a prolonged interruption in postal services).
67. See Application of International Labour Standards 2013 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report
III (Part 1A), at 106 (recognizing this situation as applied to strike by maritime workers in Greece).
68. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 157, para. 841; 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra
note 20, at 55, para. 135 (citing to Observation)
69. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 157, para. 840 (citing to numerous decisions);
2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 55, para. 135 (citing to Direct Request).
70. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 156-57, para. 840 (citing to numerous decisions);
2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 55, para. 135.
71. These include, for example, banking sector services, public transport, air transport services
and civil aviation, teachers and the public education service, port services and the loading/unloading of
ships, postal services, hotel services, and construction. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 157-60,
para. 842 (citing to numerous decisions); 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 54-55, para. 134
(citing to numerous Observations).
72. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 55, para. 136; 2018 COMPILATION, supra 20,
at 164, para. 867 (citing numerous cases).
73. Also, because such negotiated minimums curtail a basic form of pressure available to
workers to defend their interests, the affected workers’ organizations should be allowed to participate in
defining such a service, along with employers and the public authorities. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY,
supra note 20, at 56, para. 137; 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 165, paras. 869, 871. Both
supervisory bodies have stated as well that any dispute on minimum services should be resolved by a joint
or independent body (i.e. not by government authorities) that has the confidence of the parties and is
empowered to issue rapid and enforceable decisions. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 56,
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The third substantive restriction on the right to strike under Convention 87
relates to situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited
period and only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the
situation.74
With respect to all three forms of substantive restriction, the CFA and
CEACR have indicated that certain alternative options should be guaranteed for
workers who are deprived of the right to strike. These options include impartial
conciliation followed by arbitration procedures in which any awards are binding
on both parties and are to be implemented in full and rapid terms.75
2. Procedural Limitations
Apart from these substantive limitations, the right to strike under
Convention 87 has been subject to procedural prerequisites. Legislation in
numerous countries requires that advance notice of strikes be given to
administrative authorities or to the employer. National laws also provide for
cooling off periods and/or for mandatory conciliation and arbitration procedures
before a strike may be called. The ILO supervisory committees regard such
procedural requirements as compatible with the Convention so long as their aim
is to facilitate bargaining and they are not “so complex or slow that a lawful
strike becomes impossible in practice or loses its effectiveness.”76 The CEACR,
for instance, has considered that a duration of more than 60 working days as a
precondition for exercising the right to strike is excessive and may undermine
the right.77
Some countries have laws providing that a strike may not be called without
approval from a supermajority of workers.78 The CEACR and CFA have
considered that such supermajority requirements are excessive and may unduly
hinder the possibility of calling a strike, especially in larger enterprises.79 They
have suggested that for any legislatively mandated pre-strike vote, the required
para. 138; 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 167, para. 882.
74. There may be some overlap between this restriction and essential services. In the case of an
acute emergency, the prohibition should apply for a limited period, and responsibility for suspending a
strike (based on national security, public health, etc.) should be in the hands of an independent body rather
than the government. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 154, paras. 824-825; 2012 GENERAL
SURVEY, supra note 20, at 57, para. 140.
75. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 57, para. 141; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 162, para. 856.
76. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 58, para. 144; 2018 COMPILATION supra note
20, at 159, para. 795.
77. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 58, para. 144; Application of International
Labour Standards 2011 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part 1A), at 171 [hereinafter 2011 CEACR
Report] (requirement in Tanzania of 60 days’ notice “could constitute an obstacle to collective
bargaining”). Compare 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 150, paras. 801-02 (20-day notice and 40-
day cooling-off period not contrary to principles of FOA).
78. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 59, para. 147 (identifying laws in Armenia,
Honduras, Mexico requiring a two-thirds vote; Bangladesh and Bolivia a three-fourths vote); see also
Application of International Labour Standards 2017 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part 1A), at
179 [hereinafter 2017 CEACR Report] (critical of UK legislative change requiring strike approval from
over half of all workers at site, not just all workers voting).
79. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 59, para. 147; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 151, paras. 805-07.
16 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46: 1
quorum and majority for votes cast should be “fixed at a reasonable level” and
with respect to votes actually cast (as opposed to all workers at the facility).80
Many countries confer broad powers on their governments to requisition
workers in the event of a strike. The supervisory bodies have indicated a
preference that such requisitioning be limited to cases in which the right to strike
itself may be limited—namely the three substantive restrictions discussed
above.81
Finally, and importantly, the committees have determined that under the
Convention, the right to strike normally includes retention of an employment
relationship during the strike itself. In this regard, the CFA has made clear that
“[t]he use of extremely serious measures, such as dismissal of workers for having
participated in a strike and refusal to re-employ them . . . constitutes a violation
of freedom of association,”82 and that “the hiring of workers to break a strike
[that does not involve essential services in the strict sense of the term] constitutes
a serious violation of freedom of association.”83 And the CEACR has stated that
“provisions allowing employers to dismiss strikers or replace them . . . are a
serious impediment to the right to strike, particularly where striking workers
are not able to return to their employment at the end of the dispute.”84 Both
committees have thus made clear that national law and practice should protect
against such permanent replacement efforts by employers.85
C. The International Right to Strike Compared to U.S. Law
1. Increased Levels of Protection
Under the NLRA, private sector employees have a qualified right to
strike,86 while public employees are by definition excluded from coverage under
80. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 59, para. 147; 2006 DIGEST, supra note 20,
at 115, para. 555.
81. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 61, para. 151; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 172-73, paras. 920-21.
82. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 179, para. 962 (citing to discussion in eleven
decisions involving nine countries, from November 2006 to June 2014). See also id., at 172, para. 919
(identifying hiring of replacement workers for an indeterminate period as undermining the right to strike)
(citing to discussion in four decisions in four countries, from March 2007 to June 2011).
83. See 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 172, para. 918. See, e.g., Chile, June 2011, Case
2770, Report at 360, para. 372; Peru, June 2010, Case 2638, Report at 357, para. 797; Cormoros, March
2009, Case 2619, Report at 353, para. 574; Indonesia, November 2006, Case 2472, Report at 343, para.
966.
84. 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 61, para. 152 (emphasis in original, bold added).
See 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 76-77, para. 175 (describing the hiring of permanent
replacements for legal strikers as a practice that “seriously impairs the right to strike and affects the free
exercise of trade union rights”).
85. See 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 61-62, para. 139; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 172, para. 918. A number of countries expressly prohibit the use of permanent replacements
by legislation. See James J. Brudney, A Taxonomy of Striker Replacements, 39 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J.
555, 566 (2018) (referencing laws in seven countries). The author has not found a country with laws
expressly authorizing permanent replacements for workers engaged in lawful strikes.
86. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (“Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein,
shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to
affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.”).
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the statute.87 The scope and contours of the international right exceed U.S.
protections for the right to strike in two respects that are important for our
purposes; they will be addressed in detail in Parts III and IV.
One is the ban on permanent replacement of strikers under international
law. Although the NLRA is silent on this issue, employers’ right to hire such
replacements was recognized by the Supreme Court in dicta, set forth in its 1938
decision, NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.88 The right to engage
permanent replacements has been reaffirmed in a number of Court decisions
since 1938.89
A second substantial divergence involves the right to strike in the public
sector. As discussed earlier, this right is subject to relatively narrow exceptions
under international law, involving public employees engaged in administration
of the State or in providing essential services. By contrast, U.S. restraints on
public employees’ right to strike are determined under state law because the
NLRA excludes public employers from coverage. Most state governments either
prohibit or seriously restrict strikes by public employees.90 As one example, the
high-profile teacher strikes in Arizona, Oklahoma, and West Virginia since 2018
were all illegal under the laws of those states.91
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (definition of “employer” excludes “any State or political
subdivision thereof”).
88. N.L.R.B. v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
89. The Court has invoked or relied on the Mackay Radio permanent replacement doctrine in
subsequent cases. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 790 (1990); Trans
World Airlines Inc., v. Independent Fed’n of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. 426, 433-34 (1989); Belknap,
Inc. v, Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 504-05 n.8 (1983). See also 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (language added to NLRA
in 1947, addressing who can vote in representation elections, referencing that employees engaged in a
strike may be deemed not to be entitled to reinstatement). For detailed discussion of the conflict between
CIL and the permanent replacement doctrine, see Parts II.D, IV.B infra.
90. Historically, the majority rule in the states was that public-sector strikes were illegal at
common law and thus were protected only if a statute expressly authorized them. See Anchorage Educ.
Ass’n v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 648 P.2d 993, 995-96 (Alaska 1982). As of 2014, 40 states allowed at least
some public employees to engage in collective bargaining, but only 12 had statutes and/or court decisions
allowing strikes. Police officers and firefighters are prohibited from striking in all state jurisdictions,
except Hawaii and Ohio. SeeMilla Sanes & John Schmitt, REGULATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE STATES 5, 8-9, 25, 51-52 (Center for Economic & Policy Research, 2014).
A third area of expanded protection at the international level involves the definition of a
strike itself. The CEACR and CFA view limited work stoppages such as go-slow actions and work-to-
rule as presumptively protected strikes, with restrictions justified only if the action ceases to be peaceful.
See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 51, para. 126; 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 148,
para. 784. By contrast, although the NLRA text does not exclude such limited work stoppages from
protection as “strikes,” go-slow actions as a form of collective withholding of work have long been
deemed unprotected and thus subject to employer discipline. See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333
(1950). The Supreme Court has given limited protection to short-term job walkouts induced by severe
health or safety circumstances. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962). On the issue
of sympathy strikes, the CEACR and CFA appear somewhat more protective than U.S. law. The ILO
bodies regard sympathy strikes as protected based on whether the initial strike they are supporting is itself
lawful. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 51, para. 125; 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20,
at 146, para. 770. Prevailing U.S. law regards employees’ refusal to cross a lawful picket line as protected
concerted activity but also allows the employer to take responsive measures short of discharge on a case-
by-case basis. SeeWestern Stress, Inc., 290 N.L.R.B. 678 (1988); Business Services by Manpower, Inc.
v. NLRB, 784 F.2d 442, 451-54 (2d Cir. 1986).
91. See Sanes & Schmitt, supra note 90 at 14-15 (Arizona); 52-53 (Oklahoma); 64-65 (West
Virginia). For detailed discussion of the conflict between CIL and restraints on public employees’ right
to strike, see infra Parts II.D, IV.B.
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It is worth noting that while the great majority of countries have ratified
Convention 87, ratifying States do not follow the two international norms set
forth above in identical ways.92 With respect to public employees’ right to strike,
some governments guarantee the right for public workers but prohibit strikes by
“civil servants” who are variously defined.93 Other governments prohibit strikes
by “sensitive civil servants,”94 or else restrict which types of public employee
industrial actions are protected,95 or impose certain procedural restrictions on
strikes by civil servants.96 Notwithstanding these variations, however—and
unlike the case in the United States—many if not most public employees do
enjoy a right to strike under the laws of national governments that have ratified
Convention 87.97
Finally, although purely political strikes are not covered under Convention
87 principles, the CEACR and CFA have concluded that trade unions should be
able to use strike action as part of their search for solutions to problems posed
by major policy trends that directly impact their members’ socio-economic or
occupational interests—and that such strike actions are therefore not purely
political.98 Relatedly, because a democratic system is central to the free exercise
of trade union rights, workers’ organizational efforts calling for the recognition
and exercise of certain core civil liberties come within the framework of
legitimate trade union activities, including through recourse to peaceful strikes.99
Strikes based on threats to basic civil liberties occur with some frequency in
countries that lack an established democratic structure or tradition.100
92. See generally Monika Schlachter, Regulating Strikes in Essential Services from an
International Law Perspective 29, 36-37, in REGULATING STRIKES IN ESSENTIAL SERVICES (Mironi &
Schlachter eds., 2019); Christina Hiebl & Monika Schlachter, Comparative Analysis 517, 525 in id.
93. See Bernd Waas, The Right to Strike: A Comparative View, in THE RIGHT TO STRIKE: A
COMPARATIVE VIEW 42-43 (Waas ed., 2014) (discussing laws in Japan, Ecuador, Germany).
94. See id. at 43 (France).
95. See id. at 44 (Sweden).
96. See id. at 44 (Finland and Hungary).
97. There are comparable variations in approach regarding laws related to the replacement of
lawful strikers. Many countries that have ratified Convention 87 allow for temporary striker replacements
in limited circumstances even if rarely invoked. See Waas ed., supra note 93, at 61-62, 136, 253, 359
(discussing laws in Finland, Poland, Russia, Ireland, Israel, Chile, Germany, Japan). On the other hand, a
number of countries—including with some overlap—specifically prohibit the use of permanent
replacements for lawful strikers. See id.; INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAWS, vol. IA at 5-
78-79, 56-60; vol. IIA at 10-80, 16-49, 19-80, 42-48 (Keller & Darby eds., 4th ed., 2013) (discussing laws
of Finland, Germany, Japan, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland). No ratifying country appears
to authorize or permit the prompt use of permanent replacements as a matter of law.
98. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 50-51, para. 124; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 144-45, paras. 758-66. See generally id. at 136, paras. 722-23 (relying on the resolution
concerning the independence of the trade union movement, adopted by the International Labour
Conference in 1952, stating that “the fundamental and permanent mission of the trade union movement is
the economic and social advancement of the workers.”
99. See 2012 GENERALSURVEY, supra note 20, at 50-51, para. 124; 2011 CEACRReport, supra
note 77, at 166-67 (critical of Swaziland Public Order Act applied to repress lawful and peaceful strike
action); 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 144, paras. 776, 782. The resolution adopted by the
International Labor Conference in 1970 concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties
reaffirms this essential link, which was already emphasized in the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia. The
1944 Declaration was incorporated into the annex of the ILO Constitution. ILO Constitution, supra note
23, annex pt. I [hereinafter Declaration of Philadelphia].
100. See, e.g., Mark Anner, Wildcat Strikes and Better Work Bipartite Committees in Vietnam:
Toward an Elect, Represent, Protect and Empower Framework (Better Work Discussion Paper No.24,
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Protecting the right to strike with respect to concerted actions protesting
social or economic policies that have direct consequences for workers, or in
response to deprivation of civil liberties that are a precondition for the exercise
of trade union rights, may appear to have relatively little impact on the realities
of modern U.S. labor law.101 These applications, however, reflect that FOA
under Convention 87 cannot be fully developed in national settings absent a
democratic system that respects fundamental rights and civil liberties.
Particularly in situations where law or practice severely restrict democratic
developments or pluralistic alternative voices in the political sphere, trade unions
may become an important impetus for broader democratic changes.102 That kind
of situation does not seem altogether remote in the context of current U.S.
structural and political realities involving campaign finance and electoral
politics.
2. Comparative Limitations
While the international right includes protections that exceed those
available under U.S. law, the right also is subject to a series of limitations. The
range and diversity of these limitations combine to constrain the scope of an
international right to strike when compared with the U.S. statutory right to strike
in the private sector.
In substantive terms, the range of essential services where strikes can be
interdicted exceeds what U.S. law would contemplate. The ILO supervisory
bodies identify as workers providing essential services firefighters, air traffic
controllers, and security forces—all of whom would be prohibited from striking
under federal or state law. But also deemed essential under international law are
telephone services, water and electricity services, and health and ambulance
services—these workers would not be prohibited from striking under the NLRA.
Additionally, provision for negotiated minimum service that would limit
the scope of strikes even in non-essential areas allows for broader restrictions
than U.S. law currently recognizes. Further, the prohibition on strikes in
situations of acute national or local crisis allows for prohibiting strikes in the
event of a serious natural disaster. This too suggests a capacity to restrict strike
activity—during and after forest fires, earthquakes, or flooding, for instance—
that would seem to exceed what is contemplated under U.S. law.103 And from a
ILO 2017); Radio Free Asia, Rohingya Refugees Protest, Strike Against Smart ID Cards in Bangladesh
Camps (26 Nov. 2018), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5c2cc3b011.html; Michael Weissenstein &
Gonzalo Solano, Ecuador Indigenous, President Strike Deal to End Protests, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct.
13, 2019), https://apnews.com/1a0ae2d37624412a8c1cc2b9d71cf7d0;Chile Protests:What Prompted the
Unrest?, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/chile-protests-
prompted-unrest-191022160029869.html.
101. But see Katie Reilly, Here’s What 5 Teachers in Different States Are Fighting For a Year
After Walkouts and Protests, TIME (May 7, 2019), https://time.com/5583760/what-teachers-want-
national-teacher-day/; Jon N. Hale, On Race, Teacher Activism, and the Right to Work: Historicizing the
Red for Ed Movement in the American South, 121 W. VA. L REV 851 (2019).
102. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 21-22, para. 59; 2018 COMPILATION, supra
note 20, at 17-18, paras. 70-77 (citing to numerous decisions).
103. A rough analog in terms of acute national crisis might be a shutdown of freight transport
during a railroad strike. This is provided for under the Railway Labor Act through requests for the
20 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46: 1
procedural standpoint, international law’s acceptance and implicit approval of
pre-strike voting requirements differs substantially from practices under the U.S.
system, where membership typically delegates strategic choices to leaders at the
start of negotiations, including when/whether to call a strike.
To be sure, the contours of the international right to strike are subject to
myriad qualifiers at the national level. The CEACR has regularly stated that the
right must be applied based on national circumstances, and its approach to the
essential services exception, among others, reflects this reality. In addition, many
countries ratifying Convention 87 do not comply with all aspects of the right to
strike jurisprudence identified above.
Notwithstanding these country-specific variations, the existence of an
international right to strike is well established. And while governments
frequently engage ILO committees in dialogue about application to their own
national circumstances, the dialogue and disagreements occur within a
framework of accepting and respecting the existence of the right.104
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RIGHT TO STRIKE AS CIL
That an international right to strike is widely recognized by governments
does not mean the right has assumed the status of CIL. This Part seeks to forge
that link, to show how the international right to strike qualifies as CIL. It begins
(II.A) by identifying the two basic elements of CIL and explaining why the right
to strike is an integral textual and conceptual component of FOA. It then
establishes (II.B and C) that FOA and the right to strike satisfy both elements of
CIL—a general practice accepted by States, stemming from a sense of legal
obligation. While there are variations and qualifiers at the national level, the
contours of CIL status are clear: a basic right subject to three substantive
restrictions; a recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship
during the strike itself; and certain procedural prerequisites or limitations.105
This Part next demonstrates (II.D) that the two U.S. practices discussed
earlier as deviating from the international right to strike—denying all public
employees the right and authorizing permanent replacement of lawful strikers—
contravene core aspects of the right to strike as CIL. Finally (II.E), this Part
introduces the complexities of the U.S. position on FOA and the right to strike
as international rights, reflected in the failure to ratify Convention 87 while both
Congress and the executive branch embrace Convention 87 principles including
the right to strike.
appointment of a presidential emergency board. See 45 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
104. See, e.g., 2015 Final Report, supra note 24, at 13, para. 50, 55 (statements by governments
of Norway and Colombia, relying on dialogue with, and guidance provided by, ILO supervisory bodies).
105. Part II explicitly discusses one of the three substantive restrictions, involving public
employees, and also the recognition that strikers retain ongoing employment status. It does not address
the two other substantive restrictions identified in Part I, involving essential services and situations of
acute national or local crisis (see supra text accompanying notes 63-74); it also does not address the
procedural elements discussed in Part I that can limit the right to strike (see supra text accompanying
notes 76-81).
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A. Initial Definitions and Considerations
1. CIL Standards
The two basic elements that determine the existence and content of a rule
of CIL are first, the requirement of a general practice by States, and second, the
requirement that the general practice be undertaken from a sense of legal right
or obligation (opinio juris).106 The first element is objective: whether there is a
sufficiently widespread and consistent practice of States endorsing and adhering
to the rule. Evidence of such a general practice may include governmental
conduct in connection with treaties; legislative or administrative acts; decisions
of national courts; conduct in relation to resolutions adopted by an international
organization; diplomatic acts and correspondence; and executive operational
conduct on the ground.107 The second element, opinio juris, is more subjective:
the general practice must be undertaken based on its acceptance as law, rather
than being accepted based on mere usage or habit or some pragmatic motive. As
is true for general practice, evidence of acceptance as law may come in a range
of forms. These include public statements made on behalf of States; government
legal opinions; decisions of national courts; treaty provisions; diplomatic
correspondence; and conduct related to resolutions adopted by an international
organization.108
2. The Right to Strike as Integral to FOA
Freedom of association is one of the core principles on which the ILO was
founded and continues to exist.109 As set forth under Convention 87, FOA
includes a series of integral elements, of which the right to strike is one. The two
ILO supervisory mechanisms that have regularly applied or interpreted
Convention 87 have understood it to include the right to strike from the early
days of the Convention’s existence.110 Leading U.N. human rights covenants
also recognize FOA as a basic right, including the right to strike as a
component.111 And the labor provisions of the 2019 U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade
106. See Int’l Law Commission Report on the Work of its Seventieth Session, ch.V:
Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/73/10 at 117-27 (2018) [hereinafter ILC
Report]; RESTATEMENT 3D OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES sec. 102(2) (1986)
[hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]; BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, at 23-27.
107. See ILC Report at 120; BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES at 24.
108. See ILC Report at 120; BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES at 26-27.
109. See ILO Constitution, pmbl., July 28, 1919, 15 U.N.T.S. 40 [hereinafter 1919 ILO
Constitution] (identifying “recognition of the principle of freedom of association” as “urgently required”);
Declaration of Philadelphia, supra note 99 (“reaffirm[ing] the fundamental principles on which the
Organization is based and, in particular, that: (a) labour is not a commodity; (b) freedom of expression
and of association are essential to sustained progress”); 1998 Declaration, supra note 23, para. 2(a)
(“[declaring] that all Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in question, have an
obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental
rights which are the subject of those Conventions, namely: (a) freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining”); Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization
(June 13, 2008).
110. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text, discussing ICESCR and ICCPR, and fact
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agreement include the following statement: “For greater certainty, the right to
strike is linked to the right to freedom of association, which cannot be realized
without protecting the right to strike.”112 Accordingly, if FOA is seen as
Customary International Law (CIL), and the right to strike is an essential
component of FOA, then the right to strike should also be understood to be part
of CIL.
Consider in this regard the following integral elements of Convention 87.
The fact that as part of FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to
establish and . . . to join organizations of their own choosing without previous
authorization”113 means the State may not impose unreasonably high
membership requirements that hinder the establishment of organizations, or
require that members may not join several different organizations.114 Similarly,
the fact that under FOA, workers and employers “shall have the right to . . . elect
their representatives in full freedom [and that] public authorities shall refrain
from any interference which would restrict this right or impede the lawful
exercise thereof,”115 means the State may not impose limits on candidates due to
their nationality, literacy, political opinions, moral standing, or for workers, their
non-employment in the employer’s occupation or enterprise.116 And the fact that
as part of FOA, workers “shall have the right . . . to organize their. . . activities
and to formulate their programs” free “from any interference [by the public
authorities]”117 means that worker organizations, in order to defend the
occupational interests of their members, have the right to hold trade union
meetings, the right to have access to places of work and to communicate with
management, and the right to organize nonviolent protest action including
strikes.118
B. FOA and the Right to Strike as General Practice
There is ample support that FOA is widely accepted in objective terms.
Convention 87 has been ratified by 155 countries, or 83 percent of the 187 ILO
Member States.119 In addition, the ILO Constitution, endorsed by all members,
that in applying FOA and right to strike the human rights committees monitoring application of the two
covenants defer to ILO applications under Convention 87. In addition, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights recognizes the rights to freedom of assembly and association, and the right to form and
join trade unions for the protection of their interests. See arts. 20(1), 23(4).
112. USMCA, supra note 24, art. 23.3(a) n.6 (emphasis added).
113. Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 2 (emphasis added).
114. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 33-34, paras. 89-91; 2018 COMPILATION,
supra note 20, at 80-81, paras. 435-47, 88-89, paras. 477-84.
115. Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 3 (emphasis added).
116. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 40-41, paras. 102-05; 2018 COMPILATION,
supra note 20, at 114-17, paras. 609-24.
117. Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 3 (emphasis added).
118. 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 45, para. 115, 49 para. 119; 2018 COMPILATION,
supra note 20, at 135-38, paras. 717-31, 143, paras. 751-54.
119. Convention 98, addressing the right to organize and collective bargaining, has been ratified
by 167 countries. Data on ratifications is available through the ILO website. NORMLEX Information
System on International Labour Standards, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:10011:::
NO:10011:P10011_DISPLAY_BY,P10011_CONVENTION_TYPE_CODE:1,F [hereinafter Status of
ILO Conventions].
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specifies the critical role of FOA both in its 1919 founding document and the
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia as a constitutional addition.120 More recently,
ILO Declarations issued in 1998 and 2008, again embraced by all members,
make clear that even Member States that have not ratified Convention 87 are
obligated to act in good faith to respect and effectuate FOA principles.121
Beyond the ILO realm, workers’ freedom of association, including the
right to form and join trade unions and expressly the right to strike, is recognized
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly to be effective
1976.122 The Covenant has been ratified by 171 countries, including two of the
four large-population countries that have not ratified Convention 87.123 Another
major UNHuman Rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR), also adopted by the U.N. General Assembly to be effective in
1976, recognizes FOA including the right to form and join trade unions.124 The
ICCPR has been ratified by 173 countries, including three of the four large-
population countries that have not ratified Convention 87; its human rights
committee has consistently recognized the right to strike as part of FOA under
the Covenant.125 Indeed, of the 187 ILOMember States, only 11 relatively small-
population countries have not ratified at least one of Convention 87, the
ICESCR, or the ICCPR.126
120. See 1919 ILO Constitution, supra note 109, pmbl.; ILO Constitution, supra note 23, annex
pt. I.
121. See 1998 Declaration, supra note 23, para. 2(a) (quoted at supra note 109). These principles
include freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. The 1998
Declaration provides for Annual Review Reports from countries that have not yet ratified one or more of
the eight fundamental Conventions, allowing governments to report on measures taken towards achieving
respect for the Declaration, and giving organizations of employers and workers a chance to voice their
views on progress made by governments. See also ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization (2008), which adds that freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to
collective bargaining are of particular significance for the achievement of the ILO’s key strategic
objectives.
122. See ICESCR, supra note 18, art. 8; Janice R. Bellace, The ILO and the Right to Strike, 153
INT’L LAB. REV. 29, 50-52 (2014).
123. Four large-population countries have not ratified Convention 87 (though they recognize the
constitutional obligations associated with membership). Of these four, Brazil has ratified ICESCR without
reservations. India and China have ratified ICESCR with reservations placed on Article 8, providing for
it to be interpreted consistent with each country’s constitution. The U.S. has signed ICESCR but has not
ratified it. More generally, the U.S. lags well behind other States in ratifying key international covenants
related to labor and human rights, having ratified only two of the eight fundamental ILO Conventions (all
eight having been ratified by 155 or more of 187 ILO members), and having not ratified the ICESCR
(ratified by 171 of 193 UN members). For ratification status of ILO Conventions, see Status of ILO
Conventions, supra note 119. For ratification of UN Treaties, see Depositary: Status of Treaties, UNITED
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&clang=_en.
124. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 22.
125. See Macklem, supra note 48, at 72-73 & n.44 (summarizing human rights committee
applications of right to strike in Germany (1996), Chile (1999), and Lithuania (2004). Of the four large-
population countries that have not ratified Convention 87, Brazil has ratified ICCPR, again without
reservations. India has ratified ICCPR, again with a reservation placed on article 22 that it be interpreted
as consistent with article 19 of India’s constitution, which states in relevant part that “all citizens will have
the right to form associations and unions.” The United States has ratified ICCPR and has added a
reservation that none of the articles should restrict the rights of free speech and association. China has
signed ICCPR but has not ratified it.
126. The eleven countries are Brunei Darussalam, Cook Islands, Malaysia, Oman, Palau, Saudi
Arabia, Singapore, South Sudan, Tonga, Tuvalu, and United Arab Emirates. Of these, only four have
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FOA is also expressly recognized in a labor setting in the European
Convention on Human Rights, which has been ratified by all 48 countries in the
Council of Europe.127 At a national level, the vast majority of constitutions
provide for freedom of association, although some use general language that
(unlike the international instruments just mentioned) does not specify workers or
trade unions.128
Apart from States’ nearly-universal embrace of FOA as a general matter,
the right to strike itself has been broadly accepted by governments. As noted
earlier, more than 90 countries have made a public commitment to the right to
strike in their constitutions.129 These commitments have translated to actual
practice when national courts have relied on guidance from the CEACR and CFA
in assuring compliance with their constitutional right to strike. Judicial
interpretation of the international right as part of applying a domestic constitution
often involves assuring compliance by governments or employers,130 though it
also may require compliance by unions.131 And compliance with the
international right to strike may even emanate from application of a national
constitution that endorses FOA without being explicit about the right to strike.132
populations exceeding six million: Saudi Arabia (34.1 million), Malaysia (31.9 million), South Sudan
(11.1 million), and UAE (9.8 million).
127. Article 11 of ECHR closely parallels the language of Convention 87 in relevant respects,
including restriction of FOA rights for public employees involved in administration of the State:
Freedom of assembly and association; 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection
of his interests. 2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
safety . . . . This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these
rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 11, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 5 (emphasis added).
128. See CONSTITUTE PROJECT, https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=
assoc&status=in_force (applying pre-set topic of freedom of association to indicate that as of 2014, 181
out of 193 in-force constitutions have a provision on freedom of association). For geographically diverse
examples, see CONSTITUTION OF ALGERIA, art. 41; CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 8
(Braz.); KONSTITUTSIA NA REPUBLIKA BALGARIA [Constitution] art. 44 (Bulg.); CONSTITUIÇÃO DE
MOÇAMBIQUE [Constitution] art. 52 (Mozam.); CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ, art. 28;
CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA [C.E.] sec. 22 (Spain). A number of these listed constitutions (e.g., Brazil,
Bulgaria, Mozambique, Peru) expressly protect the freedom to form trade unions.
129. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., NUMSA (Nat’l Union of Metalworkers of S. Afr.) v. Bader Bop, 2002 (CC), Case
No. CCT 14/02 (S. Afr.) (applying the constitutional provision protecting the right to strike, relying on
CEACR and CFA guidance when rejecting employers’ arguments, and holding that minority unions have
the right to strike when collective bargaining negotiations have failed); Corte Constitucional [C.C.]
[Constitutional Court], agosto 10, 1999, Sentencia T-568/99, Sindicato de las Empresas Varias de
Medellín v. Ministry of Labour & Social Security (Colom.) (applying the constitutional provision
protecting the right to strike and relying on CEACR and CFA guidance to reject government declaration
of a strike as illegal when based on ruling from an administrative mechanism that was not impartial).
131. See Corte Supreme de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], agosto 27, 2014, Expediente
SL11763-2014, Radicación No. 59413, R y R. Asociados S.A. v. Nat’l Trade Union of Workers in the
Cork, Plastics, Polyethylene, Polyurethane, Synthetics, Components & Derivatives Processing Indus.
(Colom.) (applying the constitutional provision protecting the right to strike, relying in part on CEACR
and CFA analysis of acceptable procedural conditions when calling a strike unlawful, and holding that
strike was unlawful because union did not provide adequate notice).
132. See High Court of Botswana, Aug. 9, 2012, MAHLB-000674-11, Bots. Pub. Emps.’ Union
v. Minister of Labour & Home Affairs (Bots.) (interpreting Botswana’s national constitution, which
protects FOA but is silent on the right to strike, as extending to a right to strike given the country’s
ratification of C87 and C98; and further relying on CEACR guidance when holding that “essential
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Among the many national courts that have invoked the CEACR and/or
CFA in support of a right to strike,133 two other cases worth noting involve Brazil
and Kenya because neither country has ratified Convention 87. In 2012, the
Labour Court in Brazil ordered reinstatement of workers terminated for
participating in a work stoppage.134 Under Brazil’s Constitution, “norms that
define fundamental rights and guarantees are directly applicable.”135 Given that
the Court found that the employer’s conduct had violated the principle of
freedom of association and the free exercise of the right to strike, it seems that
the “principle of freedom of association” was being directly applied as a matter
of customary international law rather than through a ratified treaty or
convention.136 In 2013, the Industrial Court of Kenya ordered the reinstatement
of five workers dismissed for participating in a strike and strike-related activities.
The Court’s reasoning derived from Kenya’s general participation in the ILO,
including “respect for International Labour Standards,” rather than direct
application of fundamental norms as in the Brazil case.137 The Industrial Court
invoked a report by the CEACR and decisions by the CFA to support its decision;
its recognition of FOA as an accepted international standard suggests that reports
from the ILO supervisory bodies served as evidence of CIL.138
Finally, states’ widespread practice is reflected in the negotiation of trade
agreements over the past two decades that recognize both FOA and the right to
strike. Since 2003, labor provisions in U.S. trade agreements have regularly
featured linkages to FOA as one of the fundamental ILO norms.139 The
commitment by signatory states to FOA as understood under the 1998 ILO
Declaration has been progressively strengthened during this period—from
providing that parties “shall strive to ensure” protection of FOA under domestic
laws140 to specifying that parties shall “adopt and maintain [FOA rights] in
services” limits on right to strike imposed by statute may not include diamond cutting, sorting and selling
services, or teaching services).
133. See supra note 56 (citing to courts in eleven countries on four continents).
134. See T.S.T., No. TST-RR-77200-27.2007.5.12.0019, Relator: Min. Vieira de Mello Filho,
15.02.2012, Zavascki v. Companhia Minuano de Alimentos, Brasilia (Braz.).
135. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [Constitution] art. 5(1) (Braz.).
136. Article 5(2) of the Constitution authorizes the courts to apply as law a treaty entered into by
Brazil. Id. at art. 5(2). See Convention Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation (No. 111), June 25, 1958, 362 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Convention 111]. While the court’s
decision invokes ratified Conventions 98 and 111 (addressing collective bargaining and
nondiscrimination), neither convention discusses or refers to the right to strike as part of FOA, suggesting
that the principle was being applied through article 5(1).
137. See Univs. Academic Staff Union v. Maseno Univ. (2013) (I.C.K.) (Kenya) (“Kenya is a
member of the ILO and is expected to respect it’s [sic] obligations including respect for International
Labour Standards”).
138. It is possible that the Court was deciding the case on a quasi-treaty basis, with its obligation
coming directly from ILO membership considerations. Still, the fact that a national court recognizes FOA
and the right to strike, when its government has not ratified the ILO Convention establishing that right,
offers support for FOA as customary international law.
139. See Free Trade Agreements, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (showing bilateral agreements with Chile (2003), Peru (2006),
Colombia (2012) and Panama (2012) and, at a regional level, the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) (2004)).
140. SeeUnited States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Chile-U.S., art. 18, June 6, 2003, 42. I.L.M.
1026; CAFTA-DR, art. 16, Aug. 5, 2004, 119 Stat 462, 43 I.L.M. 514.
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[their] statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder.”141 The latest trade
agreement, involving the United States, Mexico, and Canada (approved as a
successor to NAFTA) expressly provides that the right to FOA necessarily
includes protection for the right to strike.142 Trade agreements involving EU
countries also feature commitments to respect and implement under domestic
law the principles of FOA as understood in the ILO context.143 This wide
network of similarly worded, mostly bilateral trade agreements addressing the
subject of FOA constitutes additional evidence of general practice for CIL
purposes.144
The pervasive nature of actual practice regarding FOA and the right to
strike does not mean that the right’s content is static or fixed. To be sure, there
is broad acceptance of the two previously discussed features on which U.S. law
is out of step: the prohibition on permanent replacements145 and public
employees’ right to strike with certain exceptions.146 And although particular
limits on the right may vary from one country to another, there is an international
consensus that the right exists and that any limits should be reasonable.147 The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) does not require uniformity in practice in
order to establish CIL, and indeed, it has countenanced some degree of variation:
The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the
corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In
order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that
the conduct of States should, in general be consistent with such rules.148
C. FOA and the Right to Strike as Opinio Juris
There is also considerable support for the proposition that the general
practice of states on FOA and the right to strike stems from acceptance as a
matter of legal obligation. Admittedly, while the existence of opinio juris may
be inferred from a general practice, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has
at times noted the insufficiency or inconclusiveness of such practice, instead
141. See United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Peru-U.S., art. 17, Apr. 12, 2006, 121
Stat. 1455; United States-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Colom.-U.S., art. 17, Nov. 22, 2006,
entered into force in May 2012; U.S.-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 16, June 28, 2007, 125.
Stat. 427. The same language is also included as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, art.
19.3(1), Feb. 4, 2016, which President Trump renounced.
142. See USMCA, supra note 24, art. 23.3 (Labor Rights), para. 1(a) n.6 (“For greater certainty,
the right to strike is linked to the right to freedom of association, which cannot be realized without
protecting the right to strike.”).
143. See Free Trade Agreement Between European Union and its Member States, of the One
Part, and Republic of Korea, of the Other Part, art. 13.4, para. 3, 2011 O.J. (L 127) 6, May 14, 2011,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:TOC [hereinafter Korea-EU FTA];
Free Trade Agreement, Between European Union and Its Member States, of the One Part, and Colombia
and Peru, of the other Part, art. 269, para. 3, 2017, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2012:354:TOC.
144. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, § 102 cmt. (i) (1986); Jonathan Charney, International
Agreements and the Development of Customary International Law, 61WASH. L. REV. 971, 978-79 (1986).
145. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
148. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. Reports 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua].
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seeking confirmation that “[states’] conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this
practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’”149
Trade agreements, for instance, may represent treaty law and may qualify as
evidence of general practice, but they are typically entered into by States that
have specific economic or political objectives rather than from a desire to
embrace obligations arising under international law.150 Further, it is possible that
even with respect to ILO conventions, widespread ratification is in part a
function of acculturation, insofar as endorsements across a region contribute to
socialized acceptance of norms on FOA, reassuring peer countries that protecting
rights to association including the right to strike will not place them in an inferior
competitive position.151
That said, the ICJ often does infer the existence of opinio juris from a
general practice and/or from determinations by national or international
tribunals.152 And there are ample reasons to draw such an inference here. To
start, FOA is consciously accepted as an obligation by ILO member states not
simply through ratification of Convention 87 (covering more than 80 percent of
them) but by virtue of membership itself. The ILO Constitution expressly
requires support for FOA principles, and these principles are further imbedded
through a tripartite governance structure that allocates power-sharing roles to
worker organizations alongside governments and employers.153 Thus, ILO
members understand there is an underlying obligation to respect FOA in law and
practice.154
A second reason is that domestic law can provide relevant evidence
regarding the presence of opinio juris among states. Commitments to FOA
expressed in national constitutions, statutes, and court decisions are not
necessarily evidence of a state’s belief that the principle is international as
149. Id. at 108-09 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment 1969 I.C.J. 3).
150. With respect to the Western hemisphere trade agreements discussed at notes 139-41 and
accompanying text, the “smaller” Central and South American countries are presumably seeking increased
trade with the United States. (especially for their exports) and are prepared to accept commitments to labor
standards as part of the deal. The United States. would seem motivated by an interest in enhanced markets
and also in higher labor standards that will offer greater protection for American jobs, perhaps as much
as (if not more than) it is acting based on an acceptance of international law.
151. See Sara Kahn-Nisser, The Ripple Effect: Peer ILO Treaty Ratification, Regional
Socialization, and Collective Labor Standards, 22 GLOBALGOVERNANCE 513, 525 (2016) (finding ripple
effect in EU countries since the late 1990s with respect to ratification of collective labor rights
conventions, notably Conventions 87 and 98); James J. Brudney, The Internationalization of Sources of
Labor Law, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15-16 (2017) (discussing similar pattern regarding ratification of child
labor conventions in Latin American countries during same period).
152. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 102(2), (3) cmt. b (1986); BROWNLIE’S
PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, at 39 & n.46 (citing to nine ICJ decisions from 1969 to 2011, including North
Sea Continental Shelf (1969); Gulf of Maine (1984); Nicaragua (1986); Armed Activities on the Territory
of the Congo (2005); and Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (2010)).
153. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing composition of International Labor
Conference (Parliament) and Governing Body (Executive) at 2:1:1 ratios).
154. As discussed earlier, the right to strike has been understood to be part of FOA through
Convention 87 for many decades, since shortly after Convention 87 was promulgated in 1948. And almost
all of these Member States have also ratified one or both of the dominant U.N. Covenants that incorporate
the right to strike as understood and applied by the ILO supervisory bodies. See supra notes 47-49, 122-
126 and accompanying text (discussing the ratification of ICESCR and ICCPR and their consistency of
application with Convention 87 on the right to strike).
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opposed to domestic law. Nonetheless, the International Law Commission has
made clear that evidence of acceptance as law (opinio juris) “may take a wide
range of forms,” including but not limited to “official publications; government
legal opinions; [and] decisions of national courts.”155 In this regard, the CEACR
in 2012 identified 92 countries where “the right to strike is explicitly recognized,
including at the constitutional level”; the list includes six countries that have not
ratified Convention 87.156
Recognition in domestic law of a right to strike alongside a conscious
decision not to ratify Convention 87 could give rise to an inference that these six
countries are rejecting the right as a principle of international law. However, as
explained earlier, national courts for two of the six non-ratifying countries
(Brazil and Kenya) expressly invoke ILO membership and/or principles as
guidance in their domestic law decisions.157 In addition, Canada—a country not
listed among the 92 endorsing the right to strike in the 2012 General Survey—
has since recognized a constitutional right to strike under national law, relying
in part on international law principles including CEACR and CFA
determinations.158 The Canadian Supreme Court had previously been explicit in
invoking Convention 87, ICESCR, and ICCPR as “documents [that] reflect not
only international consensus but also principles that Canada has committed itself
to uphold.”159
Further, a third country in the group of six—South Korea—has affirmed in
its trade agreements with the United States and the EU its obligation to “adopt
and maintain in its statutes and regulations, and practices” FOA in accordance
with the ILO Declaration.160 And in various CFA complaints against South
Korea for violating FOA principles, including the right to strike, the Government
has disputed the facts of the complaints while at the same time recognizing that
such rights are embedded in international law.161 Accordingly, a more relevant
reference point in this setting may be that “when States act in conformity with a
155. ILC Report, supra note 106, at 140.
156. See 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 50 n.264. The six are Brazil, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, South Korea, Morocco, and the United States.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 133-138.
158. Saskatchewan Fed. of Labour v. Saskatchewan, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (Can.) (“Besides
[Canada’s] explicit commitments [as a party to ICESCR and Charter of the Organization of American
States], other sources tend to confirm the protection of the right to strike recognized in international law.
Canada is a party to the International Labour Organization (ILO)Convention (No. 87) concerning freedom
of association and protection of the right to organize, ratified in 1972. Although Convention No. 87 does
not explicitly refer to the right to strike, the ILO supervisory bodies, including the Committee on Freedom
of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations,
have recognized the right to strike as an indissociable corollary of the right of trade union association that
is protected in that convention . . . . Striking, according to the Committee of Experts, is ‘one of the essential
means available to workers and their organizations for the promotion and protection of their economic
and social interests.’”)
159. See Health Servs. & Support Facilities Subsector Bargaining Ass’n. v. British Columbia,
2007 SCC 27, 134, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (Can.).
160. See United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., art. 19.2, June 30, 2007, 125
Stat. 428; Korea-EU FTA, supra note 143, at art. 13.4, ¶ 3.
161. See, e.g., Report No. 383, Oct. 2017 re: Case No. 3238, para. 276-282, INT’L LABOURORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:
3523636; Report No. 386, June 2018 re: Case No. 3237, para. 183-189, INT’L LABOURORG., https://www.
ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:50002:0::NO:50002:P50002_COMPLAINT_TEXT_ID:3950216.
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treaty provision by which they are not bound . . . this may evidence the existence
of acceptance as law (opinio juris) in the absence of any explanation to the
contrary.”162
Stepping back, domestic law on FOA and the right to strike, which for
many countries developed after Convention 87 and its initial applications by the
CEACR and CFA, may be viewed in part as a window into countries’ sense of
obligation in law and practice. A state may at times adopt labor provisions of a
trade agreement for reasons of comity or relative competitive advantage. These
reasons may play a more modest role with respect to adoption of certain human
rights treaties or ILO conventions.163 But evidence of practice and obligation in
the domestic law sphere—especially when informed by regard for international
instruments—seems almost by definition to be a function of acceptance as law
rather than susceptibility to strategic motivations. In this regard, there are
numerous instances in recent years where governments have expanded their
legislative protections for the right to strike following a period of dialogue with
the CEACR, and that committee has recognized and applauded the changes in
law.164 Of particular relevance to the U.S. setting, these expansions have
included assuring the right to strike for public sector employees and prohibiting
the hiring of replacements for strikers.165
162. ILC Report, supra note 106, at 139; see also Nicaragua, supra note 148, para. 186 (“If a
State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing
to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or not the State’s conduct is
in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather than to weaken the
rule.”).
163. See Bernhard Boockmann,Mixed Motives: An Empirical Analysis of ILO Roll-Call Voting,
14 CONST. POL. ECON. 263 (2003) (recognizing that countries have distinct economic interests regarding
labor competitiveness but also that there is considerable symbolic meaning in voting for many of these
conventions); Kahn-Nisser, supra note 151.
164. See, e.g., Application of International Labour Standards 2020 (I), Report of the CEACR,
Report III (Part A), at 83 [hereinafter 2020 CEACR Report] (noting with satisfaction a legislative change
by government of Bulgaria extending FOA and right to strike protections to all civil servants except for
managing senior civil servants); id. at 77 (noting with satisfaction legislative changes by government of
Botswana deleting from list of essential services a range of public sector occupations including teaching,
government broadcasting, and immigration and customs); 2017 CEACR Report, supra note 78, at 78
(noting with satisfaction a provincial legislative change in Canada granting public employees FOA rights,
including the right to engage in strike action, “in accordance with the Committee’s previous request”); id.
at 81 (noting with satisfaction legislation by government of Chile repealing prior provision that allowed
for replacement of striking workers under certain conditions and deeming such replacements in the future
a serious unfair practice warranting monetary sanctions); id. at 95 (noting with satisfaction a legislative
change by the government of Costa Rica establishing a lower numerical threshold of minimum support in
order for a strike to be legal); Application of International Labour Standards 2016 (I), Report of the
CEACR, Report III (Part 1A) at 105-06 (noting with satisfaction legislation by government of Peru
revising the required quorum or majority to call a strike so that it is fixed at a reasonable level);
Application of International Labour Standards 2015 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part 1A), at 81
(noting with satisfaction three legislative changes made by the government of Georgia abrogating
restrictions on strike action); id. at 129 (noting with satisfaction a legislative change by the government
of Swaziland (now Eswatini) deleting sanitary services from the list of essential services); id. at 130
(noting with satisfaction legislative changes by the government of Turkey, removing a number of services
from the previous strike prohibition and expanding protection for solidarity strikes and go-slows, also
noting with satisfaction a recent Constitutional Court decision removing banking services and urban
transportation services from the statutory list of essential services).
165. See supra note 164 (addressing legislative changes protecting strikes by public sector
employees in Bulgaria and Botswana (2020), Canada (2017), and Eswatini and Turkey (2015), and
addressing legislative change prohibiting replacements for strikers in Chile (2017))
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A third reason to infer opinio juris (in addition to the centrality of FOA
principles within the ILO Constitution and the strong evidence of FOA and right-
to-strike practice and obligation under domestic law) involves recent statements
from high officials in the United Nations indicating that the right to strike is
understood by its leaders as CIL. In his 2016 report to the U.N. General
Assembly, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and association explained, “The right to strike has been established in
international law for decades, in global and regional instruments, and is also
enshrined in the constitutions of at least 90 countries. The right to strike has, in
fact, become customary international law.”166
In 2018, responding to a press briefing on a strike by U.N. employees
following announced pay cuts, the Deputy Spokesman for the U.N. Secretary-
General reiterated the U.N. view that the right to strike is indeed CIL and did so
in the context of the right being asserted by public employees not involved in the
administration of the state:
Question: Does the Secretary-General believe that U.N. staff have a right to take part
in industrial action?
Deputy Spokesman: We believe the right to strike is part of customary international
law.167
These statements did not simply materialize in recent times. Two major
U.N. Human Rights treaties—the ICESCR and the ICCPR—have been
interpreted by their relevant treaty bodies to include a right to strike; these bodies
have reaffirmed their joint commitment to the right to strike as part of FOA, and
they regularly monitor governments’ record of compliance with this right.168
And as noted earlier, the two treaties—each ratified by over 80 percent of U.N
members—include a clause explicitly identifying respect for ILO Convention
87.
In sum, the principles of FOA including the right to strike would appear to
satisfy both prongs of the CIL test. The widely recognized general practice on
strikes has sufficient shape and contours: a basic right, three substantive
166. Maina Kiai (Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of
Association, para. 56, U.N. Doc. A/71/385 (Sept. 14, 2016), https://undocs.org/A/71/385.
167. Press Release, Secretary-General, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson
for the Secretary-General (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/db180316.doc.htm.
168. On reaffirmation of joint commitment, see supra note 19. On monitoring application in
national contexts, see, e.g., United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant: Concluding
observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Germany, para. 20, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (July 12, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 CESCR Report] (criticizing restrictions on the right
to strike for public servants, citing to ICESCR art. 8 and also Convention 87); ICCPR Human Rights
Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Estonia, paras. 31-32, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/EST/CO/4 (Apr. 18, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 ICCPR Concluding Observations] (joining CESCR
in urging further legislative reforms to allow the full right to strike for nonessential public servants, citing
to ICCPR art. 22); ICCPRHuman Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report
of the Dominican Republic, paras. 31-32, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/DOM/CO/6 (Nov. 27, 2017) (expressing
concern at reports that employers are restricting FOA and urging government to adopt measures that
safeguard FOA and the right to strike, citing to ICCPR art. 22).
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exceptions (public servants involved in administration of the state, essential
services in the strict sense of the term, and acute national emergencies), a
recognition that strikers retain their employment relationship during the strike
itself, and certain procedural prerequisites or attached conditions.169 There are
variations in national practice and also disagreements at the margins about what
the right to strike protects, but these aspects are not different in kind from
diversity and contests regarding international rights prohibiting child labor, or
for that matter domestic constitutional rights involving freedom of expression or
the right to bear arms. As for opinio juris, a broad range of sources combine to
establish that the general practice stems from a sense of acceptance and
obligation: ILO foundation and structure; two widely endorsed United Nations
human rights treaties; national constitutions; government representations;
domestic legislative and judicial decisions that expressly refer to or impliedly
accept international standards and practices; and contemporary U.N. leadership.
D. Public Employees and Permanent Replacement
Accepting that FOA including the right to strike qualifies as CIL, it is also
established that application of the right is based on national circumstances, and
variations exist on a country-specific basis.170 Accordingly, a question arises
whether the two practices that might give rise to a cause of action in U.S.
courts—prohibition on public sector strikes, and recognition of the right to use
permanent replacements—lie at the margins of the right to strike, governed
largely or exclusively by national circumstances, or are centrally encompassed
as part of CIL. The Article has suggested aspects of a response at different points
in Sections B and C of this Part,171 but a more direct examination seems
warranted.
1. Public Employees Have a Right to Strike,
with Limited Exceptions
On the right to strike for public employees, the presence of nationally
specific limitations for certain subgroups does not overcome States’ widespread
recognition that the right applies to public employees as a group. The recognition
is manifested initially in textual terms, through the overwhelming ratification of
Convention 87 along with the ICESCR and the ICCPR that have expressly
embraced this Convention.172 In the text of Convention 87, only one provision
explicitly assigns the scope of convention guarantees to the exclusive control of
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61, and in paragraph following supra note 103,
recognizing these variations with respect to classification of public servants exercising authority in name
of the State and in the nature of essential services.
171. See supra notes 58-62, 82-85, 92-97, 164-165, and 167 and text accompanying these
footnotes.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 49 and 119-126 (establishing that the two UN treaty
bodies have declared a specific commitment to Convention 87 and its application by ILO supervisory
bodies, and that of 187 ILO Member States, only 11 relatively small-population countries have failed to
ratify at least one of these three international treaties.
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national laws or regulations.173 This is the only provision prescribing such
exclusive control for national law within Convention 87. Apart from the armed
forces and the police, the FOA rights and protections accorded to all other public
employees are the same as for private employees. Indeed, the very concept of a
limited express assignment to exclusive national authority occurs against the
backdrop that all other coverage under Convention 87 is understood to apply
without such limitation.174 While the CEACR and CFA have recognized some
restrictions on the right to strike for public servants engaged in the administration
of the state, those restrictions are embedded in the general practice that public
servants not engaged in the administration of the state, as well as all public
employees who are not public servants, enjoy the right to strike to the same
extent as their private counterparts.175
As noted earlier, country-specific variations as to which public employees
enjoy the right to strike in practice often involve distinctions between certain
civil servants (who are prohibited from striking) and other public employees who
have the right to strike.176 Germany and Ecuador are explicit about a distinction
between all civil servants and other public workers,177 although both the
European Court of Human Rights and the relevant U.N. human rights
committees (CESCR and ICCPR) have held that a ban on strikes by all civil
servants is too expansive.178 France prohibits strikes only by “sensitive civil
servants” such as police, prison officers, and judges, while some countries
(Finland, Hungary) grant most civil servants the right to strike subject to
procedural limitations, and still others—including Ireland, Australia, Uruguay,
173. See Convention 87, supra note 33, art. 9(1) (stating that any FOA protections for the armed
forces and police “shall be determined by national laws or regulations”).
174. This expressio unius structure of Convention 87 is far from unique. Provisions in other ILO
Conventions also make it structurally explicit that only certain rights, protections, or obligations are to be
set exclusively through national laws or regulations, or that national governments have the option of
limiting the scope of their obligations under a Convention in specific respects. See, e.g., Convention
Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of theWorst Forms of Child Labour
(No. 182) June 17, 1999, 2133 U.N.T.S. 161, art. 4(1) [hereinafter Convention 182] (definition of
hazardous work that qualifies as worst forms of child labor); Convention Concerning Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment (No. 138), June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297, art. 3(2) [hereinafter Convention
138] (definition of work jeopardizing safety and health applicable to persons under age 18); Convention
Concerning Termination of Employment (No. 158), June 22, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. 159, art. 2(2)
[hereinafter Convention 158] (allowing for exclusion of certain categories of workers from termination
protection); Convention Concerning Social Security (No. 102), June 28, 1952, 210 U.N.T.S. 131, art. 2
[hereinafter Convention 102] (allowing States ratifying this basic social security convention to accept
certain articles and not others).
175. It is also notable that Convention 98, addressing the right to collective bargaining, expressly
states (art.6) that it does not deal with the position of public servants engaged in the administration of the
State. This suggests that the scope of FOA under international law, including the right to strike, is
presumptively broader regarding public servants than the scope of the right to engage in collective
bargaining.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 92-97.
177. See Waas, supra note 93, at 43-44. Waas also identifies Japan and South Korea under the
same civil servants versus other public employees umbrella. Id. at 43.
178. See Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v. Turkey, Third Section, 21 April 2009, Application No. 68959/01
(ECHR); 2011 CESCR Report, supra note 168, para. 20 (critical of restrictions on right to strike for public
servants, citing to art. 8 and also Convention 87); 2019 ICCPR Concluding Observations, supra note 168,
paras. 31-32 (joining with CESCR in urging further legislative reforms to allow full right to strike for non-
essential public servants, citing to art.22).
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and Slovenia—extend the right to strike to nearly all public sector employees.179
At the opposite extreme, Chile has ratified Convention 87 but under law prohibits
strikes by public employees. Yet as a matter of practice, public employee trade
unions in Chile regularly negotiate and exercise the right to strike in that
country.180 Andwhile there is an ongoing dialogue between various governments
and the CEACR and CFA regarding the range of public employees that may be
excepted from the right to strike,181 this dialogue often helps lead governments
to reduce the scope of their constraints on the right.182 In short, the general
practice that emerges is of public employees enjoying the right to strike, subject
to limited exceptions that vary in size and scope.
As for opinio juris, it is useful to reiterate the ICJ interest in confirmation
that “[States’] conduct is ‘evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered
obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.’”183 Legal obligation to
protect public employees’ right to strike has been recognized in recent times by
a number of states, including Bulgaria, Botswana, Canada, Eswatini, and Turkey.
These governments have amended their laws to grant or extend public
employees’ right to strike, as part of a dialogue with the CEACR.184 Further
support comes from national court decisions in Kenya and Canada, recognizing
public employees’ right to strike as CIL based wholly or in part on reports from
ILO supervisory bodies.185 This range of recent country-specific examples
illustrates the sense of obligation regarding public employees’ right to strike that
emanates from international sources of authority.
2. Lawful Strikers May Not be Permanently Replaced
Inclusion of a ban on permanent replacement of lawful strikers as part of
CIL stems almost definitionally from international understanding of the right to
strike itself. Under broadly endorsed legal norms, the employment relationship
is suspended but not terminated during a lawful strike. Employees are not
compensated while on strike, but they resume the contractual relationship with
179. SeeWaas, supra note 93, at 42-44.
180. See id. at 43. See also Chilean Public Employees on Strike, LATIN AMERICAN HERALD
TRIBUNE, http://laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=364460&CategoryId=14094 (reporting 80,000 public
employees staging strike on June 11, 2020).
181. See, e.g., 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 52, para. 130 & n. 279 (identifying
governments that imposed undue restrictions on the right to strike according to the CEACR’s country-
specific observations and direct requests in 2010-2011).
182. Among governments identified in the 2012 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, para. 130,
see, e.g., 2020 CEACR Report, supra note 164, at 83 (CEACR expresses satisfaction with legislative
change in Bulgaria extending right to strike protections to virtually all civil servants); id. at 43 (noting
legislative change by government of Albania providing right to strike to civil servants with some limits);
Application of International Labour Standards 2014 (I), Report of the CEACR, Report III (Part 1A), at
104 (noting with interest legislative change by government of Estonia restricting ban on public employee
strikes to public servants exercising authority in name of the State); Panama, Dept. of State, 2019 Country
Reports, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, sec. 7(a) (noting that by law the majority of
public employees now may strike although not employees of the Panama Canal Authority).
183. Nicaragua, supra note 148, at 108-09 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Neth.),
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3).
184. See supra note 164 (identifying details).
185. See notes 137-38 and accompanying text (decision by Industrial Court of Kenya); notes 158-
59 and accompanying text (decision by Canadian Supreme Court).
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their employer when the strike ends, absent unusual unlawful or violent
conduct.186 This helps explain the difference between national laws allowing
temporary striker replacements in specific circumstances and the same national
laws banning permanent replacements.187 Other common law countries similarly
provide that the use of replacement labor is limited to the period during which a
lawful strike takes place.188 The United States is highly unusual if not unique in
authorizing permanent replacements for lawful strikers.189
Unsurprisingly, the CFA and CEACR have condemned employers for
dismissing strikers and refusing to take them back.190 The great majority of
caselaw examples involve disputes in which the government declares a strike
unlawful when dismissing the workers, a declaration disputed by the workers
and usually by the CFA, but a declaration reinforcing the prevalent norm that
lawful strikes do not warrant such dismissals and replacements.191 The CEACR
and CFA discussion of the U.S. example is again distinctive for its emphasis on
legislation or caselaw authorizing permanent replacement of lawful strikers.192
Finally, regarding opinio juris, the reality that almost no countries endorse
permanent replacement of lawful strikers largely removes prospects for
demonstrating that banning the practice is undertaken based on its acceptance as
law. That said, one recent example involves the government of Chile: the
CEACR in 2017 noted with satisfaction that the government had repealed a prior
provision allowing for replacement of striking workers under certain
circumstances, and had deemed such replacements in the future to be a serious
unfair labor practice warranting monetary sanctions.193 And as noted above, the
fact that almost all governments dismissing and replacing strikers seek to defend
their practice based on the unlawfulness of the strike194 reflects a tacit
understanding of legal norms related to replacing lawful strikers. In sum the
prohibition against permanent replacements is at the center rather than the
186. See, e.g., International Labor and Employment Laws, supra note 97, vol. 1A at 3-77
(Belgium); 4-63 (France); 5-78, 5-79 (Germany); 7-56 (Spain); 50-120, 50-126 (South Africa); 75-62
(Brazil).
187. See, e.g., laws of Bulgaria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Germany, Japan, and
Netherlands, discussed in Brudney, supra note 85, at 566.
188. See M.M. Botha and M. Lephoto, An Employer’s Recourse to Lock-Out and Replacement
Labour: An Evaluation of Recent Case Law [2017] PER 34, TAN 77-78,
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/PER/2017/34.html#_ftnref77 (South Africa). In the United Kingdom,
lawful strikers are protected against dismissal for at least the first 12 weeks of a strike. See If we go on
strike, are we protected from dismissal?, WORKSMART, https://worksmart.org.uk/work-rights/trouble-
work/industrial-action/if-we-go-strike-are-we-protected-dismissal.
189. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 333 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (discussed at
supra text accompanying note 88).
190. See supra sources at notes 84 and 85.
191. See, e.g., 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 172, para. 918 (referring to Thailand, 372d
Report, Case No. 3022 (2014); Pakistan, 365th Report, Case No. 2902 (2012); Philippines, 346th Report,
Case No. 2488 (2007); Sri Lanka, 344th Report, Case No. 2380 (2007); Colombia, 343d Report, Case No.
2355 (2006)).
192. See 1994 GENERAL SURVEY, supra note 20, at 76, para. 175 (“The difficulty [with hiring
replacement workers in a lawful strike] is even more serious if, under legislative provisions or case-law,
strikers do not, as of right, find their job waiting for them at the end of the dispute” with a footnote
reference to a CFA case involving the U.S.).
193. See supra note 164.
194. See supra cases discussed at note 191 and accompanying text.
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margins of the right to strike, given that virtually no countries besides the U.S.
allow it under law, and those that invoke it in practice are persistently excoriated.
E. The U.S. Position on FOA and Right to Strike as International Rights
How does the U.S. position on FOA and the right to strike fit into the CIL
story? On the one hand, the U.S. is generally reluctant to ratify international
human rights conventions, a reluctance evidenced in the administrations of both
parties.195 And the executive branch is unlikely to conclude as a matter of
diplomacy that an international human rights norm is CIL without engaging in
an extensive internal interagency clearance process.196 On the other hand, the
U.S. is one of six countries that recognizes a right to strike even while refusing
to ratify Convention 87.197 And in trade legislation as well as recent free trade
agreements, Congress and the executive have endorsed the FOA principles of
Convention 87 despite not moving toward ratification. Accordingly, the complex
U.S. position on whether FOA and the right to strike are international rights that
could be accepted as CIL warrants attention.
1. Formal Response to International Instruments
In terms of formal responses to international instruments, the U.S. has
ratified ICCPR with some reservations, but these do not restrict its commitment
to FOA generally—indeed one reservation singles out FOA for special
protection.198 The U.S. has signed ICESCR but has not ratified it,199 just as it has
not ratified Convention 87.
The U.S. is, however, committed to the principles of FOA set forth in the
convention, through its enduring support of key constitutional documents and
ILO Declarations.200 In this regard, the failure to ratify Convention 87 since
195. See Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race Relations, the
Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 321, 327-28 (2010); Louis Henkin, U.S.
Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341-350
1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 263 (2002). One theory is that the reluctance is located to a considerable extent in the
Senate, because under Article II of the Constitution, a minority veto (one-third plus one of a Senate
quorum) is sufficient to defeat ratification.
196. See Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking,
38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359, 391-97 (2013).
197. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
198. See Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Declarations and
Reservations: United States, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en
(last visited Jan. 7, 2021), Reservations, para. 1. The U.S. also ratified ICCPR with the express declaration
that it was not a self-executing treaty and therefore did not itself create obligations enforceable in the
federal courts. See id., Declarations, para. 1. The absence of legal obligations created under the Covenant
does not detract from the instant argument based on CIL.
199. See generally Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365 (1990). For discussion of
political realities in the Senate, flowing from the Cold War era, that impeded efforts to ratify the ICESCR
and other human rights instruments from the Carter through Clinton administrations, see Connie de la
Vega, Human Rights and Trade: Inconsistent Application of Treaty Law in the United States, 9 UCLA J.
INT’L L. AND FOR. AFF. 1, 11-14 (2004). See generally Bradley, supra note 195.
200. See supra 1919 Constitution Preamble, 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, 1998 Declaration
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President Truman submitted it to the Senate in 1949 would not confer the status
of “persistent objector” to the CIL norm of FOA.201 Any potential U.S. objection
has not been “maintained persistently,” and in light of the Truman
administration’s support for the Convention in 1949 an objection was not made
“while the rule was in the process of formation.”202 Moreover, persistent objector
status has little traction in the ILO setting, where promulgation of conventions
carries only the expectation that a government will make its legislature aware of
the convention’s existence with no obligation to act for or against ratification.203
The U.S. also has not attempted to attach a reservation to Convention 87 or
indeed any ratified convention—and in ILO practice such reservations are not
accepted.204
In recent decades, there has been an awareness among national political
leaders of both parties that failure to ratify fundamental ILO conventions
undermines U.S. credibility when defending human rights generally and when
using trade policy to promote respect for internationally recognized worker
rights.205 In a 1985 Senate committee hearing on the U.S. relationship with the
ILO, the principal focus was on how non-ratification adversely impacted the U.S.
status in the ILO, as well as on whether ratifying various conventions would
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair
Globalization, at notes 109, 120, 121 and accompanying text, all of which emphasize the importance of
FOA.
201. A persistent objector is a sovereign State that has clearly objected to a norm of customary
international law since the norm’s formation, and considers itself not bound to observe the norm. See
BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES, supra note 13, at 28.
202. See ILC Report, supra note 106, at 152 (Conclusion 15). For a description of the Truman
Administration’s review of Convention 87, culminating in its support for ratification, see U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, BRIEFING PAPER ON ILO CONVENTION 87 CONCERNING FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (Oct. 1980)
[hereinafter DOL BRIEFING PAPER], reprinted in The United States and the International Labor
Organization: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong. 49-53 (1985).
203. See ILO Constitution, supra note 23, art. 19(5)(a) (requiring that Conventions adopted by
the International Labour Conference be communicated to all Member States for possible ratification).
Under Article 19(5)(b)-(e), the legislative body in each Member State, once made aware of a new
Convention, may decide to pursue ratification, to decline such an effort, or to defer action.
204. Unlike other human rights instruments, ILO conventions are the product of its tripartite
governance structure, involving voting and decision-making rights for employer and worker
organizations. See supra note 34. It would undermine this structure to allow one member of the tripartite
group—governments—to undo even partially what all three groups have agreed upon. See Lawrence R.
Helfer, Understanding Change in International Organizations: Globalization and Innovation in the ILO,
59 VAND. L. REV. 649, 686 (2006). A handful of conventions do allow for flexibility at the national level
on an express basis. See, e.g., Convention 182, supra note 174, art. 4(2) (types of hazardous work for
children shall be determined by national law); Convention 138, supra note 174, art. 2 (minimum age shall
be specified by each country so long as tied to compulsory schooling age level); Convention 158, supra
note 174, art. 2(2) (allowing countries to exclude certain categories of workers from job-termination
protection); Convention 102, supra note 174, art. 2 (allowing ratifying States to accept certain social
security articles and not others). Convention 87 does not include such provisions.
205. See Steve Charnovitz, The ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and its Future in the
United States, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 90, 94-98 (2008). Charnovitz focuses on observations from Republican
leaders during the 1980s. In 2010, the Obama Administration Department of Labor attempted to rekindle
ratification efforts. Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis chairs 1st meeting of Presidents Committee on the
International Labor Organization in 10 years. See https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ilab/
ilab20100505 (Department of Labor press release, May 5, 2010). The press release refers to Secretary
Solis planning to work with the President’s Committee toward ratification of Convention 111, prohibiting
employment discrimination; however, no proposal was submitted to the Senate from 2010-2016.
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require modification to federal law.206 But the issue of the U.S. rejecting or
disagreeing with FOA on the merits did not come up. If anything, the hearing
largely affirmed that the U.S. believed it was in substantial conformity with the
principles of Convention 87,207 and that “even if a country does not ratify many
conventions, it is still responsible as an ILO member for complying with the
basic principles of the labor rights conventions, Nos. 87 and 98.”208
2. Political Branch Positions on FOA and Right to Strike
This approach has been reinforced by the support of the executive branch
at various points for ILO efforts on FOA with other countries. Undersecretary of
Treasury for International Affairs Timothy Geithner noted in a 2000 House
hearing that Indonesia had ratified Convention 87 “partly in response to the
urging of the United States.”209 And the Bureau of International Labor Affairs
(ILAB) in the Department of Labor has regularly monitored and reported in
detail on labor standards performance regarding FOA and other fundamental
principles by countries with whom the U.S. has trade agreements.210
Beyond the testimony and conduct of executive branch officials, Congress
has enacted legislation making clear that the U.S. recognizes the FOA principles
of Convention 87 even without ratifying the convention. In 1984, Congress
included “freedom of association” as an “internationally recognized worker
right” in the Trade and Tariff Act.211 In the 2002 Trade Act, after the prior law
had expired, Congress explicitly noted that the “overall trade negotiating
objectives” should include the promotion of “worker rights . . . consistent with
core labor standards of the ILO,” including freedom of association.212 Because
206. See DOL BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 202, at 1-2 (Sen. Hatch); id. at 4 (Sen. Thurmond);
id. at 5, 9 (Secretary of State Schultz); id. at 26-33 (Secretary of Labor Brock). See also Orrin G. Hatch,
Ratify International Labor Conventions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 10, 1985) (stating that “our
dismal non-ratification record undercuts our credibility at the ILO”). Both Secretary of State Schultz in
1985 and Secretary of Labor Dole in 1989 observed that because we have not ratified most ILO
conventions, we are prohibited under the ILO Constitution from bringing complaints against other
governments for non-compliance with those conventions. See DOL BRIEFING PAPER at 8 (Secretary
Schultz); Charnovitz, supra note 205, at 94-95 (reproducing statement from Secretary Dole).
207. See DOLBRIEFING PAPER, supra note 202, at 12 (Secretary Schultz). But cf. id. at 80, 91-
97 (statement of Abraham Katz, U.S. Council for International Business, describing various issues on
which Convention 87 was alleged to be inconsistent with U.S. labor law).
208. Id. at 21 (Secretary Brock).
209. Indonesia: Confronting the Political and Economic Crises: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International Relations,106th Congress
53, 58 (2000).
210. From the Obama Administration, see, e,g., Standing Up for Workers: Promoting Labor
Rights through Trade (2015), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/standing-workers-promoting-labor-
rights-through-trade; Public Report of Review of U.S. Submission 2012-01 (Honduras) (2012),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/public-report-review-submission-no-2012-01-honduras. From the
G.W. Bush Administration, see, e,g., Labor Rights Report: Chile (2003),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/labor-rights-report-chile; Labor Rights Report: Singapore (2003),
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/labor-rights-report-singapore.
211. Pub. L. No. 98-573, Sec. 503 (1984) (“For purposes of this title, the term ‘internationally
recognized worker rights’ includes—(A) the right of association; (B) the right to organize and bargain
collectively . . .”).
212. 19 U.S.C. § 3802(a). The 2002 Act requires that U.S. trade agreements aim “to strengthen
the capacity of United States trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards.” Pub. L. No.
107-210, § 2102(b)(11)(C), 16 Stat. 994 (2002).
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“[n]ational legislation, while it is most often the product of political choices, may
be valuable as evidence of acceptance as law,”213 these statutory additions
provide further support for the argument that the U.S. recognizes the principles
as binding. They also reinforce the notion, mentioned earlier in relation to 1980s
testimony by executive branch officials, that Congress’s refusal to ratify
Convention 87 may well be for reasons unrelated to the Convention’s core
principles.214
Moreover, the evolving emphasis on FOA in the labor provisions of
congressionally ratified trade agreements further strengthens the U.S.
commitment to FOA as an international set of rights. Trade agreements
negotiated in 2003 and 2004 specified that the parties shall “strive to ensure”
protection under domestic laws for FOA and other labor principles recognized
under the 1998 Declaration.215 Agreements negotiated after 2006 provided more
forcefully that each party shall “adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations,
and practices thereunder” the rights to FOA and others as stated in the ILO
Declaration.216 During this same time period, the U.S. government has
repeatedly linked FOA and the right to strike. In its 2015 presentation to the ILO
Governing Body, the U.S. representative stated as follows:
In the decades since the adoption of Convention No. 87, the CEACR and CFA had
provided observations and recommendations with regard to the right to strike . . . .
[T]hey had observed that freedom of association and particularly the right of workers
to organize their activities for the purpose of promoting and protecting their interests
could not be fully realized without protecting the right to strike . . . . The CFA had
confirmed and applied the relationship between the right to strike and the right to
freedom of association in almost 3000 cases without dissent. The United States
concurred [with the statement of the Government Group] that the right to strike was
protected under Convention No. 87, even though the right was not explicitly
mentioned in the Convention.217
And as noted earlier, in the 2019 U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement,
negotiated by President Trump to replace NAFTA and endorsed by the
executives of all three countries in December 2019, the labor provision
emphasizes that “[f]or greater certainty, the right to strike is linked to the right
to freedom of association, which cannot be realized without protecting the right
to strike.”218
213. ILC Report, supra note 106, V: Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc.
A/73/10 (2018), Conclusion 10, Cmt. (5), p. 141
214. Cf. Flomo v. Firestone Rubber Co, 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (expressly crediting
this possibility in relation to U.S. failure to ratify Convention 138 on child labor).
215. See CAFTA, art. 16.1 (2004); Chile FTA, art. 18.1 (2003).
216. See Peru FTA, art. 17.2 (2006); Panama FTA, art. 16.2 (2012); Colombia FTA, art. 17.2
(2012).
217. See 2015 Final Report, supra note 24, at 5, para. 16.
218. See U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, art. 23.3, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-
trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between. Dec. 13, 2019 text. This is
not to suggest that the Trump Administration is prepared to introduce legislation prohibiting permanent
replacements or protecting strikes by state and local government employees. But it is worth noting the
contrast between reluctance by Republican administrations to strengthen the right to strike under domestic
law with consistent U.S. government support in recent decades for FOA principles internationally
including the right to strike.
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3. Federal Courts’ Position on CIL as National Law
What about the position of the federal courts toward CIL and its acceptance
as national law in the US? The leading Supreme Court decision, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain,219 involved a claim by Alvarez-Machain for violation of CIL under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS).220 A cause of action under the ATS may be
distinguished from the right to strike setting in two respects. As a jurisdictional
matter, the ATS typically involves lawsuits alleging violations of CIL committed
in foreign countries and brought by citizens of foreign countries. By contrast, as
developed in parts III and IV, the right to strike as CIL would be asserted by U.S.
workers against U.S. employers within the U.S. Further, as explained in Part III,
the CIL right to strike is to be asserted directly as a form of federal common law,
rather than being applied through a particular statute that may impose its own
historically grounded limits.221
At the same time, the substantive standard set forth in Sosa is relevant in
allowing for suitably delineated CIL to be directly applied in domestic federal
and state court contexts.222 While urging lower courts to exercise a “restrained
conception” when considering new causes of action based on CIL, the Court in
Sosa added that such claims can be recognized if “rest[ing] on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have
recognized.”223 The Court’s formulation in the ATS setting is slightly different
from the two elements—general practice and opinio juris—that have been
discussed at length in defining and applying modern CIL.224 But Sosa’s emphasis
on international law norms that are precisely defined and reflect the importance
of general practice is compatible with contemporary conceptions of CIL.225
Lower courts have understood that Sosa sets a “‘high bar to new private
causes of action’ alleging violations of CIL”226 based on whether the sources of
such law are “sufficiently specific, universal, and obligatory.”227 But they have
proceeded to recognize such causes of action when “multiple international
agreements (including one that is binding on more than 160 signatory states), as
well as the domestic laws of over 80 states, adopt a particular definition of that
219. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
221. See Martin S. Flaherty, Jesner and the Supreme Court’s Ongoing Assault on International
Human Rights, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2017-2018 111, 119-20 (Stephen D. Schwinn ed., 2d ed.,
2018) (discussing Court’s reliance in Sosa on causes of action under late-18th century Law of Nations
when fashioning new CIL causes of action under ATS).
222. See generallyMcGinnis, supra note 25, at 490-93 (noting Sosa’s implications for deriving
CIL beyond the ATS setting); William S. Dodge, After Sosa: The Future of Customary International Law
in the United States, 17 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &DISP. RESOL. 21 (2009).
223. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
224. See supra Parts II.A.1, II.B, II.C.
225. See Flaherty, supra note 221, at 120-21. Applying the standard to the facts before it, the
Court concluded that—even assuming a CIL norm that prohibits prolonged arbitrary detention—Alvarez-
Machain’s claim based on his illegal detention of less than a day could not qualify. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
736-37.
226. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Sosa).
227. Id. at 174 (referencing Sosa and Paquete Habana).
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norm.”228 As has been amply demonstrated in sections B and C of this Part, the
universality of the claims based on the right to strike as part of FOA can qualify
under this approach. The right is recognized under multiple international
agreements (including ILO conventions ratified by over 150 states and other
international agreements ratified by over 170 states); regional human rights
agreements around the world; domestic constitutions and laws in over 90
countries; and major court decisions at both a regional and national level.
Further, this CIL norm includes a sufficient level of specificity regarding the two
key areas that are the focus of analysis for purposes of U.S. law: the right of
public employees to engage in strike activities with limited exceptions and the
right of all strikers to be protected against permanent replacement.229
All of the above suggests that U.S. failure to ratify Convention 87 is likely
to be compatible with its recognizing FOA and the right to strike as CIL.230 At
the same time, there is no independent or tripartite analysis comparing
Convention 87 to U.S. labor law, identifying what changes in national and state
law would be needed to comply with the Convention in general and the right to
strike in particular.231 U.S. employer representatives have expressed concern that
ratification would alter national and state labor law in a number of important
respects including the right to strike.232 Given the U.S. historical position of non-
objection alongside non-ratification, the Article next addresses whether—even
if the right to strike under FOA is accepted as CIL in traditional international law
terms and is recognized under the Sosa standard—the right can be asserted in
U.S. courts as CIL. This question implicates several distinct problems, which are
discussed in Parts III and IV.
228. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 377, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (invoking
the standard applied by the Second Circuit in Abdullahi (id. at 384-85) and recognizing plaintiffs’ claims
based on crimes against humanity). See Abdullahi, 562 F.3d at 184-85 (relying inter alia on ICCPR in
recognizing claims based on nonconsensual medical experimentation); M.C. v. Bianchi, 782 F. Supp. 2d
127, 130-31 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (recognizing claims based on child sex tourism); John Roe I v. Bridgestone
Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 1019-22 (S.D. Indiana 2007) (recognizing claims based on child labor);
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 686-87 (S.D. Texas 2009) (recognizing claims based
on forced labor and trafficking). See also Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.3d 699, 716-
17 (9th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that acts of torture by government violate CIL); Khulumani v. Barclay
Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (concluding that liability
for aiding and abetting violations of international law is itself “sufficiently ‘well-established[][and]
universally recognized’ to be considered customary international law for the purposes of the ATCA”).
Although these claims were all brought under the jurisdiction of the ATS, the substantive Sosa standard
is relevant when directly applying CIL in the domestic context. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying
text.
229. See supra notes 58-74, 85-100, 164-65 and accompanying text.
230. This recognition is not essential for CIL to exist; FOA and the right to strike can still qualify
based on sufficiently broad acceptance and obligatory reasoning as set forth in parts II.B and C above.
See Flomo v. Firestone Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 2011) (U.S. and other developed
countries cannot “veto” CIL through one or two refusals to ratify a convention that otherwise meets the
standards). Still, in order for this CIL to have a chance at being enforceable in U.S. courts, recognition of
its sufficiency under the Sosa standard is likely important.
231. See Charnovitz, supra note 205, at 103.
232. See Edward Potter, The Growing Importance of the International Labour Organization: the
View from the United States, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 356 (John Craig &
Michael Lynk eds., 2006); Edward E. Potter, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE OF RATIFICATION OF ILO
CONVENTIONS NO. 87 AND NO. 98 (Labor Policy Assn., 1984); DOL BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 202
(testimony from U.S. Council of International Business at 1985 Senate committee hearing).
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III. INTERACTION BETWEEN CIL AND OTHER FORMS OF U.S. LAW
A. Preliminary Framing
In order for the international right to strike to receive protection in a U.S.
domestic law setting, this CIL right must be cognizable in federal court. Workers
asserting such a right would be seeking direct application of CIL, stemming from
legal principles set forth in The Paquete Habana233 and subsequent cases.
The Paquete Habana involved U.S. seizure of two Spanish fishing vessels
during the Spanish American War. The Court relied on customary international
law to hold that the vessels and their cargoes were exempt from capture as prizes
of war.234 Justice Gray’s oft-quoted language, recognizing that CIL is part of the
law of the United States, is as follows:
International law is part of our law and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending
upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there is
no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations . . . .235
In a number of decisions beginning in the 1960s, the Court has applied CIL
rules when determining the legal status of submerged offshore areas, helping
guide its application of federal statutes and treaties implicating the law of the
seas.236 The Court has also invoked CIL in determining when an instrumentality
of a sovereign state becomes the “alter ego” of that state, a question not
controlled by the relevant foreign sovereign immunity statute.237 Relatedly, the
Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino238 relied on a judge-made
principle of U.S. foreign relations law—the Act of State doctrine—to decline to
examine the validity of the taking of property by a foreign sovereign government
within its own territory.239
Turning to lower federal courts, the courts of appeals have regularly
applied the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties “as an articulation of the
233. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708.
234. See id. at 708.
235. Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
236. See Koh, supra note 27, at 1836 & n.64 (summarizing e.g., United States v. Alaska, 521
U.S. 1, 15-21 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 588 & n.10 (1992); United States v.
Louisiana, 470 U.S. 93, 106-07 (1985); United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 22 (1969); United States
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 164-65 (1965)).
237. First Nat. City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterio de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 626-27
(1983). The Court made clear that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act could not resolve this issue—it
was a matter of CIL plus federal common law. Id. at 621-22. For a lower court application of this alter
ego rule, see EM Ltd v. Banco Central de la Republica Argentina, 800 F.3d 78, 89-96 (2d Cir. 2015).
238. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)
239. Id. at 431-37. The Act of State doctrine, adopted by British as well as American courts,
provides that courts will not sit in judgment of a foreign government’s acts done within its own territory.
The doctrine, while not required as a matter of treaty law or CIL in the U.S., reflects judicial respect both
for the sovereignty of other nations and for the authority of the U.S. executive in foreign affairs. See Louis
Henkin, International Law as U.S. Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1559 (1984) [hereinafter Henkin,
International Law as U.S. Law]. See generally Belhaj and another v. Straw and others, Rahmatullah (no
1) v. Ministry of Defence and another, [2017] AC 964, [2017] 3 All ER 337 (discussing the scope and
applicability of Act of State doctrine in the UK).
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customary international law of treaty interpretation, even though the United
States is not a party to the treaty itself.”240 And at least one district court has
recognized FOA and the right to organize as CIL when denying a motion to
dismiss.241 Finally, the executive branch also has applied CIL in certain
circumstances. Although the U.S. voted against adoption of the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Seas, the U.S. government accepts its key
provisions regarding the maximum breadth of territorial sea and the extent of
exclusive economic zones as CIL.242 In short, U.S. courts and executive branch
officials have directly applied CIL and been guided by its teachings in a range of
doctrinal settings.243
As noted earlier, CIL on human rights has been deemed applicable in U.S.
courts for suitably defined misconduct occurring in other countries.244 These
doctrinal precedents do not involve direct application of CIL in a domestic law
setting akin to the labor and human rights claims being proposed here. That said,
lower courts have invoked CILwhen applying federal rules of decision in a range
of domestic law contexts. Indeed, the use of CIL when applying and construing
various federal statutes has increased markedly in recent decades.245 Examples
include its use when applying an armed conflict statute to establish limits on
detention of a U.S. citizen within the U.S.;246 when construing the same statute
to help establish requirements for release and repatriation of a foreign national
held on U.S. soil;247 and when limiting the scope of an immigration statute’s
240. Pliego v, Hayes, 843 F.3d 226, 232 (6th Cir. 2016) (referencing applications by three other
circuits). See also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 194 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(invoking the Vienna Treaty as authority under CIL).
241. See Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co. Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1262-64 (N.D. Ala.
2003). See also Aquamar S.A., v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999)
(invoking CIL to assist in determining whether foreign government waived sovereign immunity in action
by Ecuadorian shrimp farmers alleging severe economic damage from herbicides and pesticides).
242. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, ADMIRALTY ANDMARITIME LAW28-29, § 2-2 (fifth ed. 2011);
Paul C. Ney, Jr., The Charney Lecture: The Rule of Law in International Security Affairs: A U.S. Defense
Department Perspective, 52 VAND. J. TRANS. L. 773, 790 (2019) (Sept. 3, 2019 speech by U.S. Defense
Dept. General Counsel underscoring U.S. acceptance of these provisions as CIL).
243. See also Graham, 560 U.S. at 80-82 (2010) (invoking the laws and practices of other nations,
including international human rights treaty and the “overwhelming weight of international opinion,” as
relevant and confirmatory support for conclusion that imposing life-without-parole sentences on juveniles
violates Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 575-78 (2005) (relying on decades-long practice of looking to other countries and international
authorities, including ICCPR, as “instructive for its interpretation of” the Eighth Amendment prohibition,
in concluding that imposing death sentence for juveniles constitutes cruel and unusual punishment); id. at
604-05 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (observing with approval that for nearly 50 years “the Court has
consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assessment of evolving standards
of decency.”).
244. See supra note 228 for cases recognizing claims under the Sosa standard, brought pursuant
to the ATS, that involved crimes against humanity; nonconsensual medical experimentation; child sex
tourism; child labor; and forced labor.
245. See Bart M.J. Szewczyk, Customary International Law and Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis of Federal Court Decisions, 82 G.W. L. REV. 1118, 1134-46 (2014) (identifying six
categories of cases where courts invoked international custom as part of interpreting federal statutes:
extraterritoriality; sovereign immunity; law of armed conflict; maritime cases; immigration including
international human rights; and other).
246. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
247. See Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
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authorization of detention.248 In addition, CIL has been applied to help courts
apply the choice between indefinite detention and exclusion under a different
immigration statute,249 and to assist judicial construction of a statute regulating
recovery of sunken warships in U.S. waters.250 It is not obvious why CIL should
be deemed inapplicable when construing federal statutes that implicate
appropriately qualified labor/human rights misconduct occurring within our
borders.251
Moreover, as previously noted, a number of other countries have accepted
the right to strike as a principle of international law when applying their own
domestic law despite their conscious decision not to ratify Convention 87.252
Once one accepts that recognized CIL has substantive traction in a domestic law
setting, the focus should be on whether this CIL can be situated in relation to
certain procedural or jurisdictional limitations that characterize the U.S. judicial
context. Accordingly, application of CIL to sustain claims based on FOA and the
right to strike requires consideration of how this CIL relates to other aspects of
U.S. law.
B. CIL as Federal Common Law
A threshold question is whether U.S. courts should determine matters of
CIL as federal common law or as state law in light of the Erie doctrine.253 The
question has been extensively debated by able international law scholars,254 and
I will not attempt to add new value in this setting. I am persuaded that CIL should
be understood and litigated as federal common law, for reasons presented at
length in a range of sources.255 Indeed, as one international law scholar has
248. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829-30 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds sub nom
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (invoking Charming Betsy canon to construe 1996 immigration
reform statute so as to comply with CIL prohibition against prolonged arbitrary detention).
249. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. See Sea Hunt Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel or Vessels, 221 F.3d 634, 643 (4th
Cir. 2000).
251. See supra note 243 for Eighth Amendment cases. And consider child labor as an example
different from the right to strike. Under U.S. law, children at age 14 may work regularly as baristas,
bussers, dishwashers, cashiers, and fast food restaurant cooks. See 29 C.F.R. § 570.34. Under Convention
138 (ratified by 173 of 187 ILOMember States but not the U.S.), the minimum age for such non-hazardous
jobs in developed countries is 15 (see Convention 138, supra note 174, arts. 2(3), 2(4)(5)). Assuming
arguendo that the age-15 standard passes muster under Sosa (a non-trivial question, although I have shown
this test can be satisfied in the right to strike context), one would hope that 14 year olds in Boston would
have the same international protections as 14 year olds in Berlin or Buenos Aires. But cf. United States v.
Bellaizac-Hurtado, 700 F.3d 1245, 1254-58 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that drug trafficking does not violate
CIL, and Congress’s determination that it does inMaritime Drug LawEnforcement Act is unconstitutional
under “Offences against the Law of Nations” clause of Article I).
252. See notes 134-138 and accompanying text (describing domestic courts’ reliance on
international law in Kenya and Brazil, countries that have not ratified Convention 87). See also notes 154-
155 and accompanying text (discussing Canadian Supreme Court’s recent reliance on international law
when recognizing right to strike under its domestic constitutional law).
253. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
254. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 27 (arguing that CIL is state law) with Koh,
supra note 27 and Henkin, International Law as U.S. Law, supra note 239 (arguing that CIL is federal
law).
255. See Koh, supra note 27; Carlos M. Vazquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A
Critique of the Revisionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 N. DAME.
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recently and thoroughly explained, “[t]he law of nations was the original federal
common law.”256
The basic contours of this position were set forth by the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino, when it held that the Act of State doctrine is federal law, binding on
the states and not within the scope of Erie.257 In the words of Justice Harlan for
an eight-member majority, “an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the
competence and function of the Judiciary and National Executive in ordering our
relationships with other members of the international community must be treated
exclusively as an aspect of federal law.”258 Subsequently, leading commentators
have joined the Court in concluding that Eriewas never meant to apply to CIL;259
that federal courts’ incorporation of the CIL of labor and human rights follows
post-Erie precedent recognizing and helping to create a federal common law for
labor relations and for other uniquely federal interests;260 that CIL may reflect
developments in the international arena of labor and human rights in addition to
filling gaps with respect to jurisdictional statutes such as the ATS and the Torture
Victim Prevention Act (TVPA);261 and that CIL remains subject to the
democratic checks of supervision, endorsement, or revision by the federal
political branches.262 Relying on the weight of these arguments in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., Justice Scalia for the Court recognized that a few
areas involving “uniquely federal interests” are committed to federal control,
including the development of federal common law, and he cited Court precedent
on CIL as one such area.263
L. REV. 1495, 1620-23 (2011); William Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93
VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1 (2007); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International
Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463 (1997); Gerald Neuman, Sense and
Nonsense About Customary International Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997); Beth Stephens, The
Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997); THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, at § 111, Reporter’s Note 3.
256. Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the Judiciary Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707, 1745
(2018)
257. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425-27.
258. Id. at 425.
259. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425 (relying inter alia on 1939 law review article by Professor
Philip Jessup, subsequently appointed to the International Court of Justice); Lee, supra note 256, at 1734-
36 (discussing how Erie was limited solely to the power of federal judges to make rules of decision based
on general law in citizen-citizen diversity controversies and did not foreclose federal courts’ power to
invoke CIL as rules of decision under any of the other Article III grants of judicial power).
260. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426-27 (noting in precedential terms certain distinctly federal
interests such as construing collective bargaining agreements to promote stable labor-management
relations, establishing rights and duties of the U.S. regarding commercial paper, and resolving water
apportionment or boundary disputes between states).
261. TVPA, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.73 (1992).
262. See Koh, supra note 27, at 1841-45; Vazquez, supra note 255, at 1570-72; Goodman &
Jinks, supra note 255, at 515-29. For arguments that CIL should be regarded as state law, see, e.g., Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 27; Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional
Approach to the Alien Tort Statute, SUP. CT. REV. 153 (2004); Julian Ku, The State of New York Does
Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004).
263. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (citing Sabbatino, 376
U.S. at 426-27).
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C. The Presence or Absence of Controlling Law
As indicated in The Paquete Habana excerpt above, an important
additional consideration is whether there is a treaty or any “controlling executive
or legislative act or judicial decision” that would preclude federal courts from
recognizing a right to strike as CIL. Lower court decisions invoking the
“controlling law” principle from Paquete Habana have applied a fairly rigorous
standard, relying on a comprehensive scheme of statutes and regulations
addressing the precise issue,264 or on a treaty ratified by the U.S. directed to the
same problem.265 These lower courts also have invoked Supreme Court
statements that focus on the central role of legislative expression when
concluding that certain controlling congressional acts were taken with a purpose
to preclude the application of CIL to a particular situation.266
Under this standard, controlling U.S. domestic law does not preclude
federal courts’ authority to recognize a right to strike as CIL; on the contrary, it
arguably supports such authority. As an ILO member, the U.S. is a party to the
1944 Declaration of Philadelphia, the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, and the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a
Fair Globalization.267 Each of these core ILO commitments specifies the
fundamental importance of FOA. Congress in two separate trade statutes has
incorporated FOA as an “internationally recognized worker right.”268 In
addition, the U.S. has ratified the ICCPR, which has incorporated the right to
strike as part of FOA, and has signed the ICESCR, which expressly recognizes
that right within its text.269 And both the Administration’s 2015 statement at ILO
Governing Body proceedings and its most recent trade agreement, drafted and
executed by the Trump Administration, have specified that the right to strike is
an integral part of FOA.270
It is worth emphasizing this series of developments. United States political
diplomacy and input from executive branch experts has helped the transnational
264. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Gonzales, 247 Fed. Appx. 782, 786 (6th Cir. 2007) (controlling statutes
and regulations govern requirements for reopening INS removal proceedings); Galo-Garcia v. I.N.S., 86
F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (Congress has enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme for admission
of refugees including procedures for deportation, hence CIL is inapplicable); Clancy v. Office of Foreign
Assets Control of U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, 2007 WL 1051767 at *16-17 (E.D. Wisc. 2007).
265. SeeUnited States v. Frank, 486 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2007). The Eleventh Circuit
in an earlier context had found such controlling authority in the acts of the Attorney General denying
parole revocation hearings to a group of unadmitted aliens. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446,
1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986). There has been broad scholarly criticism of the determination that CIL can be
disregarded based on the controlling act of any executive official other than the President, or even by the
President himself unless Congress has authorized such disregard by statute. See, e.g., Agora: May the
President Violate Customary International Law? 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 913-37 (1986) (essays by Jonathan I.
Charney, Michael J. Glennon, and Louis Henkin).
266. See Oliva v. U.S. Department of Justice, 433 F.3d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting The
Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) and Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (2004) in holding that the INA
provision defining circumstances under which hardship to child can be considered as ground for relief
from removal, rather than CIL, governed alien’s application).
267. See supra notes 109 and 121 (specifying language of these three declarations)
268. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying texts.
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legal process to strengthen the international right to strike. The U.S. has been a
leading advocate on the international stage promoting both FOA principles and
the right to strike—in its trade legislation, bilateral and regional trade
agreements, and official positions at the ILO Governing Body. That the U.S. has
not ratified Convention 87 does not mean it is somehow undemocratic or
improper for U.S. officials to be bound by rules that U.S. influence helped create.
To be sure, Sosa recognizes that Congress may “shut the door to the law of
nations” explicitly or implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the field.271
And there is some domestic law that is inconsistent with the right to strike set
forth in CIL. As discussed in Part I.C, this law notably includes a 1935 statutory
provision exempting states as “employers” under the NLRA, thereby relegating
public employees to state-by-state regulation of FOA and the right to strike; and
a 1938 Supreme Court decision allowing private employers to hire permanent
replacements for strikers.272 But these expressions of domestic law do not appear
to be “controlling” in the relevant sense of addressing or responding to the CIL
that is asserted here. The 1935 statutory provision and 1938 Supreme Court
decision predate the promulgation of Convention 87 by a decade or more—hence
they are not in any way responsive to the existence of FOA or the right to strike
at an international level.273
The Court has relied on its 1938 statutory interpretation decision approving
of permanent replacements in more recent decades.274 And there were legislative
efforts in the early 1990s to overturn the permanent replacement doctrine that
did not succeed.275 It is possible to contend that despite the absence of legislative
approval for permanent replacements, the Court’s continuing endorsement of its
jurisprudence, and Congress’s failure to override those decisions, are sufficiently
controlling in this context.
On the other hand, there is a respectable and perhaps persuasive argument
that these judicial decisions and instances of congressional inaction do not
amount to a sufficiently comprehensive scheme of statutes and regulations
addressing the precise issue.276 Relatedly, there is no indication that either the
Court or Congress acted with a purpose to preclude the application of CIL in the
right-to-strike setting, or even with an awareness that relevant CIL existed.277 In
this regard, it is noteworthy that the international right to strike assumed
271. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731.
272. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1935) (defining employer to exclude state and local governments);
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (allowing for permanent
replacements in dicta), both discussed at supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
273. The 1947 statutory amendment addressing when replaced strikers can vote in union
elections—referenced at supra note 89—also predates the promulgation of Convention 87 in 1948.
274. See supra note 89 (referring to Court decisions from 1990, 1989, and 1983).
275. In two successive Congresses, bills to overturn the doctrine passed the House but failed to
overcome a filibuster in the Senate. For 1991-92 Congress, see 137 Cong. Rec. 18,655 (1991) (recording
House approval of bill to ban permanent replacements by vote of 247-182); 138 Cong. Rec. 14,875 (1992)
Senate cloture vote fails 57-42). For 1993-94 Congress, see 139 Cong. Rec. 12,866 (1993) recording
House approval of bill to ban permanent replacements by 239-190); 140 Cong. Rec. S8524 (daily ed. July
12, 1994 (Senate cloture vote fails 53-47).
276. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 266 and accompanying text.
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increased visibility and importance beginning in the mid to late 1990s, following
elevation of FOA as one of the eight fundamental ILO conventions and the
promulgation of the 1998 Declaration. The Supreme Court in the context of
admiralty law—relying on the law of nations—has applied recent CIL to
overrule its own precedents, or to bypass or distinguish earlier statutory
provisions.278 In doing so, the Court has recognized the primacy of evolving
developments in CIL so long as these changes in the law of nations are not
directly contradicted by earlier federal statutory text.279
Violations of CIL, like violations of international law generally, can
produce friction between nations that hinders the accomplishment of foreign
relations goals.280 As noted earlier, government officials and scholars have
expressed concern in recent decades that failure to ratify Convention 87 and
other fundamental ILO conventions can undermine U.S. standing on matters of
international labor and human rights law.281 At the same time, the U.S. has been
a leading advocate on the international stage promoting both FOA principles and
the right to strike—in its trade legislation, bilateral and regional trade
agreements, and official positions at the ILO Governing Body. And again, while
CIL can give way when there is genuinely controlling positive law, such law
must be meant to control an otherwise applicable CIL. The mere presence of a
relevant statutory provision or judicial decision, without evidence that Congress
or the court was aware the CIL existed, is unlikely to qualify.
Moreover, if there is a potential conflict between established CIL and
sufficiently clear federal statutes, the relative timing of these two sources of law
becomes important. The Court has made clear that Congress can override CIL
based on subsequent clear legislation.282 It is also well-settled that federal
statutes and treaties are equal in authority such that “if a treaty and a federal
statute conflict, ‘the one last in date will control the other.’”283 Given the status
278. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388 (1970) (overruling CIL
precedent to allow recovery for wrongful death action from unseaworthiness in state territorial waters,
based on intervening developments in the law of nations and despite recognized gap in statutory
coverage); Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1974) (extending recovery for such
unseaworthiness actions in territorial waters to cover loss of society despite longstanding federal statutory
precedent prohibiting such recovery from wrongful death actions on the High Seas). Admiralty law is an
area in which international jurisprudence has historically played a prominent role. That said, a major thrust
of this Article is the increased role of CIL in the labor and human rights area on a global scale as well as
in the U.S. It is also noteworthy that the role played by CIL in Moragne and Gaudet involves the rights
and remedies available for workers and their families.
279. See Moragne, 398 U.S. and Gaudet, 414 U.S. where the Court established rights and
remedies under CIL applicable in territorial waters that coexist with or supersede whatever rights and
remedies might have been relevant under federal statutes governing the High Seas. See generally David
W. Denton Jr., Lifting “The Great Shroud of the Sea”: A Customary International Law Approach to the
Domestic Application of Maritime Law, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 25 (2012).
280. See Vazquez, supra note 255, at 1620.
281. See supra notes 205-06 and accompanying text; de la Vega, supra note 199, at 3-4, 11-15.
282. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731. For a contrary argument, that CIL should always supersede
inconsistent federal statutes because it is constantly being renewed through actions and beliefs of the
international community, see Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional
Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J.
INT’L L. 393 (1988).
283. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888)). SeeCook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118-19 (1933) (holding that a later treaty supersedes
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accorded to CIL as federal law comparable to treaties, it should follow that the
last-in-time rule also applies to resolve any differences between an earlier-
enacted federal statute and a later CIL norm, at least one that meets the Sosa
standard of definiteness, specificity, and widespread acceptance.284
Applying the last-in-time rule in our setting, the two most prominent
divergences between CIL and existing federal statutory law would be resolved
in favor of CIL. The NLRA doctrine allowing employers to permanently replace
lawful strikers is not addressed at all in the text. It was derived from the 1935
law as part of a 1938 Supreme Court interpretation that has been relied upon in
subsequent Court decisions through the late 1980s. The exemption of state and
local government workers from federal law was itself part of the 1935 statute.
Both the Court decisions establishing a permanent replacement doctrine and the
text exempting state and local governments arose well before—and with no
evident awareness of—the establishment and evolution of CIL on FOA and the
right to strike. This CIL began emerging in the late 1960s and became fully
developed from the late 1990s, continuing to the present.
Admittedly, even later-in-time CILwill not overcome a clear constitutional
ruling addressing the precise legal issue, inasmuch as CIL is understood to have
the status of a statutory norm rather than a constitutional one.285 But the Supreme
Court’s most direct constitutional pronouncement, from 1926, held that there is
no absolute right to strike as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.286 In a later case, the Court held that strikers’ rights of association
are not undermined if the government declines by statute to subsidize the
exercise of the right through food stamps.287 Because the international right to
strike is far from absolute, it is unlikely that these and other Supreme Court
decisions invoking constitutional considerations are incompatible with
recognition of the less-than-absolute right as a matter of CIL.
Instead, application of the CIL right to strike gives rise to conflicts with the
two different aspects of U.S. statutory law identified above. The permanent
replacement doctrine was judicially constructed in the face of an inconclusive or
silent text. As discussed in Part IV below, the presence of such statutory
ambiguity implicates the Charming Betsy canon, developed by the Court to help
address conflicts between statutory text and international law, including CIL.288
an earlier statute).
284. See Henkin, International Law as U.S. Law, supra note 239, at 1566; Szewczyk, supra note
245, at 1172-76. See generally Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L.
930, 933 (1986) [hereinafter Henkin, The President and International Law] (“[C]ourts will probably
conclude that customary law, being equal to treaties in international law, has the same status as treaties in
the domestic legal hierarchy as well . . . . If so, like a treaty, a principle of customary law will not be given
effect if supervening national legislation is inconsistent with it. But a supervening principle of customary
law will not be denied domestic effect because of some earlier act of Congress.”). Because the Sosa
standard of definiteness, specificity, and widespread acceptance is not readily satisfied, courts are likely
to invoke the last-in-time rule for CIL on an infrequent basis. See Szewczyk, supra note 245, at 1177.
285. See Henkin, The President and International Law, supra note 284. See also THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, at sec.115, comment d (noting that in regard to the law of the sea, the
United States has accepted CIL that modifies earlier treaties and also U.S. statutes).
286. See Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926).
287. See Lyng v. International Union UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1988).
288. See The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118 (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be
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This canon has been invoked in labor-related settings when seeking to avoid
conflict with treaties or international legal obligations involving foreign
employers.289 It also may be applied where the international legal norms are
protective of workers.
Separate considerations come into play regarding states’ right to prohibit
strikes by all public employees. This issue has been raised in the CFA, which
reviews complaints under Conventions 87 and 98 against all member states
including those that have not ratified those two conventions. A 2009 complaint
brought by national and local labor unions against the U.S. attacked New York
state legislation barring all strikes in the public sector, and its specific application
to the transport sector, as violative of both conventions.290 In its response to the
CFA, the U.S. emphasized its “unique, decentralized and diverse system of
government [is] rooted in the U.S. Constitution,” adding that state and local
labor-management relations are understood as “essential functions” of these
governments’ “separate and independent existence.”291 The U.S. relied on the
same legal position of powers constitutionally reserved to the states when
defending against a similar complaint that attacked North Carolina’s statutory
prohibition on collective bargaining agreements for public employees.292
The Supreme Court in the past had recognized the constitutional
sufficiency of these state legislative judgments regarding assertedly essential
sovereign functions and deferred to them on federalism grounds.293 But its more
recent decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority294
arguably requires a different analysis. By holding that the states are amply and
adequately protected in Tenth Amendment terms through the federal political
process,295 the Court in Garcia removed the Tenth Amendment as an absolute
barrier to federal law—including CIL as federal common law.
In Garcia, the relevant federal law was the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), involving Congress’s authority to subject state and local governments
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
289. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1982) (holding that canon was consistent
with scope of a labor agreement executed by the President providing for preferential employment of
Filipino citizens at U.S. military facilities in Philippines); Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306,
312-13 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (objecting that canon should have applied to help deny Jones Act
jurisdiction to an alien seaman seeking damages for injury sustained aboard a foreign-flag vessel in a U.S.
port). But cf. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119, 142-43 (2005) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (contending that canon should not be read so broadly as to preclude application of Americans
With Disabilities Act to foreign cruise ships “where there is no potential for international discord”).
290. Case No. 2741, Nov. 10, 2009 [hereinafter Case No. 2741], closed November 2011, reported
in full in Report No.362; see 2018 COMPILATION, supra note 20, at 154-55, para. 830. See also Case No.
2460, Dec. 7, 2005 [hereinafter Case No. 2460], closed March 2007, brought by national and local labor
unions against the United States, attacking North Carolina state legislation that prohibits collective
bargaining agreements in the public sector, reported in full in Report No.344; see 2018 COMPILATION,
supra note 20, at 233, para. 1242.
291. Case No. 2741, supra note 290, para. 756.
292. Case No. 2460, supra note 290, para. 965. Cf. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 519-20 (recognizing
that an agreement to give domestic effect to the result of an international adjudication can be obligatory
“so long as the agreement is consistent with the Constitution”).
293. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
294. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
295. Id. at 547-57.
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to generally applicable federal laws—in that instance to treat their status as
public employers the same as private employers for purposes of wage and hour
regulation. The instant setting likewise involves a federal standard, incorporated
through CIL, that would subject state and local government employers to the
same generally applicable legal norm as private employers, here with respect to
regulation of labor-management relations. It therefore differs in material respects
from post-Garcia decisions invalidating federal government efforts to
commandeer the States as implementers of federal regulation,296 or to enlist state
and local officials in such implementation.297
Accordingly, state and local governments have no constitutional shield
against CIL standards regulating and protecting the right to strike by public
employees, just as they had no such shield after Garcia against federal standards
establishing public employees’ right to overtime protections. These governments
remain free to persuade Congress to enact federal laws that would restore
restrictions or prohibitions on strikes as they have existed in many
jurisdictions.298 That in fact is what they did following Garcia, lobbying
successfully to modify federal wage and hour law with respect to overtime
compensation for state and local government employees.299 But until such laws
are enacted by Congress, one can argue that the later-in-time CIL rule protecting
the right to strike for most public employees—those not engaged in the
administration of the state or in essential services—remains controlling. Put
differently, the default following Garcia is not deference to states under the
Tenth Amendment but recognition of states’ capacity to protect themselves
through Congress.
IV. THECONTOURSOF ACAUSE OFACTION FOR THERIGHT TOSTRIKEUNDERCIL
Assuming that the CIL right to strike is cognizable as federal common law
and that there is no controlling federal law precluding recognition of a CIL cause
of action, there remain the challenges of how such a cause of action might be
formulated and what obstacles it would face.
A. A Non-Statutory Cause of Action Seeking Injunctive Relief
My focus is on the two salient conflicts identified in earlier Parts between
the CIL right to strike and federal statutory law: permanent replacement of lawful
strikers in the private sector and prohibitions on public employees’ right to strike.
Although these conflicts involve the conduct of private employers and states, not
the federal government,300 the Article anticipates a right of action against the
296. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61 (1992) (distinguishing Garcia).
297. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904-05 (following New York v. United States).
298. See supra note 90 (discussing state laws expressly authorizing strikes by public employees
in 12 states out of 50).
299. See FLSA Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207(o)
(establishing procedures for negotiating and administering compensatory time instead of overtime for
state and local government employees).
300. Federal law, separate from the NLRA, directly prohibits strikes by federal employees. See
Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7103(a)(2)(B)(v), 7311(3). Some
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U.S. as a sovereign bound by international law, including CIL. The cause of
action would be for injunctive or declaratory relief, seeking to ensure there are
no legal obstacles to the CIL right to strike, obstacles created either directly or
indirectly by the NLRA and Supreme Court interpretations of that statute.
When reviewing federal common law actions for damages against federal
officials, the Supreme Court in recent decades has cautioned lower courts, acting
as “common-law tribunal[s],” to “pay particular heed . . . to any special factors
counseling hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”301
Because this is an action for injunctive or declaratory relief rather than damages,
the Court’s oft-stated instruction about “special factors counseling hesitation”
does not obviously apply. The Court in recent years also has been skeptical about
implying causes of action for injunctive relief in a statutory setting.302 At the
same time, the Court has been willing to justify an implied cause of action based
on the substantive prohibitions found in a statute,303 or on regulations carrying
out a statute’s objectives.304
Given this contested landscape, it seems apparent that a domestic law
action for injunctive relief based on CIL would need to be precisely focused,
addressing issues that are squarely within the CIL domain while minimizing
interference with the sovereign status of the U.S. and implementation of
otherwise-applicable federal law. This aspect of tailoring requires more attention
than can be given here.305
Regarding jurisdiction, however, there is ample authority for plaintiffs
suing federal officials in their official capacity for injunctive relief to stop
threatened or ongoing violations of constitutional rights without violating
sovereign immunity.306 While this would be a cause of action to stop ongoing
violations of CIL rather than the Constitution, the same principles could apply.
federal workers, like air traffic controllers, would be regarded as performing essential services under CIL
while others would not. Formulating a cause of action against the federal government qua employer seems
less challenging once causes of action are deemed appropriate against the federal government as enabler
of CIL violations by private employers and state/local government employers. Accordingly, the Article
does not address actions against the federal government as an employer.
301. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378
(1983)). This line of constitutional damages actions against public officials originated in Bivens, 403 U.S.
at 396 (damages based on violations of Fourth Amendment rights). Early post-Bivens cases recognized
additional causes of action for damages; see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Eighth Amendment);
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (Fifth Amendment). For more recent skepticism toward new
Bivens damages actions, see Ziglar, 137 S.Ct. 1843; Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118 (2012);Wilkie, 551
U.S. 537.
302. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001). See also Correctional Services v.
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “we have abandoned that power
to invent “implications” in the statutory field”).
303. See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2005) (distinguishing and
limiting Sandoval)
304. See Global Crossing Telecomm. v. Metrophones Telecomm., 550 U.S. 45, 58-59 (2007)
(distinguishing Sandoval).
305. See generally Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Cal. & N.D. Cal.
2009) (three-judge court) (addressing challenges of issuing a prisoner release order to address
overcrowding and inadequate medical and mental health care in California prisons).
306. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 489, 491 n.2
(2010); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1968); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-
20 (1912).
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Justice Harlan in his Bivens concurrence emphasized the broad reach of a federal
court’s equitable powers, extending to all areas encompassed by the grant of
federal question jurisdiction.307 More recently, courts of appeals have recognized
that individuals may challenge the actions of federal agencies or officials through
non-statutory review.308 They have concluded that jurisdiction is available under
the general federal question statute, and there is no sovereign immunity bar with
respect to injunctive relief.309
Ironically, the most relevant precedent may be Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich,310 in which the D.C. Circuit established a non-statutory right of action for
employers to challenge President Clinton’s Executive Order as inconsistent with
the permanent replacement doctrine established by the Supreme Court.
Borrowing from the justification in Reich, a district court here would have
original jurisdiction in a suit to prevent deprivation of rights accorded under
CIL.311 And courts should presume that agencies are expected to obey the
commands of CIL and grant relief in such settings, just as (in Reich) they were
expected to obey the commands of the Court’s ongoing interpretation of a federal
statute.312
B. Pursuing the Cause of Action in Federal Court: Two Approaches
The D.C. Circuit in Reich relied on the canon disfavoring implied repeals,
because the later-enacted Procurement Act (on which the Executive Order was
based) did not contradict the NLRA itself.313 By contrast, the later-evolved CIL
on the right to strike does directly contradict the text and application of the
NLRA. As evidenced by the CEACRGeneral Survey, the CFA Compilation, and
numerous other transnational and national sources, there is a direct conflict
between CIL and the Supreme Court interpretation of the NLRA on permanent
replacement, as well as the NLRA provisions declining to apply federal law to
strikes by public employees.
Regarding the permanent replacement of private strikers, a different canon
than the one disfavoring implied repeals becomes important. The Charming
Betsy canon provides that when legislation is ambiguous, it should be construed
to conform to international law, including the “law of nations” or CIL.314 Federal
courts have made clear that they will apply the Charming Betsy principle if
307. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 404-05.
308. See, e.g., Mittelman, 757 F.3d at 307; Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 189; Chamber of Commerce v.
Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
309. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1329 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682, 690-91 (1949)).
310. Id. at 1322.
311. Id. at 1328.
312. Id.
313. The court noted that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 40 U.S.C. § 471
et seq. (Procurement Act), enacted in 1949, does not address labor relations in any way. See Reich, 74
F.3d at 1332. While the Secretary of Labor relied on language in the Procurement Act bestowing broad
discretion on the President to set procurement policy, the court found that position tantamount to an
argument for repeal by implication, which it rejected. Id. at 1332-33.
314. See Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 117-18.
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conflict exists between CIL and statutes that are ambiguous or inconclusive.315
Thus, a federal appeals court—recognizing a “clear international prohibition”
against prolonged and arbitrary detention, evidenced inter alia in the ICCPR—
construed an ambiguous statutory immigration provision so as not to authorize
the indefinite detention of removable aliens.316 And a district court—relying on
a ratified OECD Convention—construed an ambiguous criminal statute so as to
authorize broad prosecution of bribes involving officials of State-owned
enterprises.317
At the same time, lower courts have indicated that the Charming Betsy
canon comes into play only when the statute itself is ambiguous. “It is always
the case that clear congressional action trumps customary international law and
previously enacted treaties.”318 When a statute makes plain Congress’s intent,
“Article III courts . . . must enforce the intent of Congress irrespective of whether
the statute conforms to customary international law.”319
In this context, the permanent replacement doctrine is best understood as
reflecting not clear congressional action but rather an inconclusive statutory text.
When the Supreme Court grafted a permanent replacement doctrine onto the
NLRA in 1938, it acknowledged that the doctrine was not based on any language
in the text itself.320 Statutory amendments from 1947 and 1959 make no
reference to an employer’s right to hire permanent replacements for lawful
strikers. The only mention of strikers not entitled to reinstatement is language
added in 1947 and modified in 1959,321 discussing voting eligibility for
employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement.
But that reference, in a section titled “Representatives and Elections” that is
unrelated to the section dealing with lawfulness of employer practices, is at best
ambiguous.322 Non-entitlement to reinstatement could be for various reasons,
and the agency is given broad discretion to determine voter eligibility “consistent
315. See Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 135-36; United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir.
2003) (per curiam), cert. denied 540 U.S. 933 (2003); Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 1982); U.S. v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp.
2d 1108, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
316. Kim Ho Ma, 257 F.3d at 1114. The Ninth Circuit decision followed by one month a remand
from the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, 533 U.S. 678 (consolidated with Kim Ho Ma). Justice Kennedy,
although disagreeing with the Court’s interpretation of the immigration statute at issue, recognized the
relevance of CIL doctrine on detention of refugees and asylum seekers. See id. at 721 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
317. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1116-17.
318. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Tomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 2008) (internal
quotations omitted).
319. Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 135-36 (citing Yousef, 327 F. 3d at 93 (per curiam)).
320. See Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345-46, which relies on gaps in statutory language:
“Although section 13 of the act, provides, ‘Nothing in this Act (chapter) shall be construed so as to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike,’ it does not follow that an employer,
guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and continue his business by
supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.”
321. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
322. Section 9, “Representatives and Elections” addresses issues wholly distinct from those
covered in separate Section 8, titled “Unfair Labor Practices.” See 29 U.S.C. § 159; 29 U.S.C. § 158.
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with the purposes and provisions of this subchapter.”323
As previously noted, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have invoked
the permanent replacement doctrine.324 Yet still other Court decisions are
arguably inconsistent with Mackay Radio,325 and the legal basis for allowing
permanent replacements has been harshly criticized for decades.326 In the early
1990s, Congress came close to prohibiting the doctrine, while making no textual
changes during its effort.327 Overall, continued reliance on a controversial Court
decision that construed statutory silence, and instances of congressional failures
to act, would not appear to qualify as unambiguous statutory action trumping the
CIL that has developed during and after the Court actions and congressional
inactions, and that is now well-established. As discussed in Section III.C, the
Supreme Court in admiralty law has overruled precedents or distinguished
statutes when newer developments in CIL justify such action.328 In this setting,
the Charming Betsy canon could encourage an updated construction of the
NLRA, essentially forcing the Court to rethink its position.
Regarding the prohibition on coverage for state employers, this statutory
language is unambiguous and therefore the Charming Betsy canon has no
application. The conflict here involves the United States allowing the states
unlimited rights to control the strike-related activities of their employees. As
explained above, the United States has justified this unlimited right of control
before the CFA by relying on the dual sovereignty of federalism as a
constitutional matter.329 But that is not obviously applicable after Garcia altered
the constitutional equation in 1985 with respect to laws of general applicability.
Moreover, CIL on the right to strike comes into its own long after the 1938
exclusion of states from federal statutory coverage. Instead, the U.S. should grant
injunctive relief prohibiting states from violating CIL regarding the right to
strike, at least until Congress has addressed the issue.
323. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3). For instance, employees who engage in a strike within any applicable
statutory notice period lose their status as employees for purposes of section 9, although they can regain
this status if and when re-employed by the same employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
324. See supra note 89 (identifying Curtin Matheson Scientific, 494 U.S. at 790; Trans World
Airlines, 489 U.S. at 433-34 (1989); Belknap, 463 U.S. at 504-05 n.8).
325. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 373 U.S. 221, 231-33 (1963) (holding that grant of super-
seniority to strikers who cross picket line is unlawful while hiring permanent replacements for strikers is
protected). As prominent labor-law scholars explain, “it is as though the law permits killing but not
wounding.” JULIUS G. GETMAN, BERTRAND B. POGREBIN & DAVID GREGORY, LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS AND THE LAW 166 (1999). See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34-35
(1967) (affirming NLRB holding that employer must advance legitimate business reasons for failure to
pay striking workers their accrued vacation benefits while paying such benefits to striker replacements
and returning strikers); id. at 39 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing out conflict between Court’s holding
and right to hire permanent replacements with no showing of business justification underMackay Radio).
326. See Pope, supra note 9; GETMAN, POGREBIN & GREGORY, supra note 325; Karl E. Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,
62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-02 (1978); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning
a Misnomer: “Protected” Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 383 (1969); Note, Replacement of
Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 634, 639-41 (1966); Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers,
35 ILL. L. REV. 817, 830-32 (1941).
327. See supra note 275 (describing House passage on two occasions, followed by majority
support in Senate to break filibuster that did not reach the required level of 60 votes).
328. See supra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 290-92 and accompanying text.
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C. CIL Applied in State Courts
The Supreme Court has made clear that state statutes intruding into the
realm of foreign affairs raise constitutional concerns.330 On the other hand, state
courts for a century or more have applied CIL as common law authority in
matters involving foreign affairs and international law.331 And in the decades
since Erie, state courts have relied on this CIL as federal common law that
trumps state statutory arrangements.332 As expressed by the New York Court of
Appeals, “[i]t is settled that, where there is neither a treaty, statute, nor
controlling judicial precedent, all domestic courts must give effect to customary
international law.”333
Accordingly, the right to strike as CIL may be applied by state courts in
appropriate contexts. One setting of particular relevance involves the right to
strike in states where public employees are entirely prohibited from doing so
under state law. The argument based on Garcia, which was advanced to address
federalism concerns of assertedly constitutional magnitude, is available to state
judges as well as their federal counterparts. But in addition, and importantly,
state courts in jurisdictions that ban all public employee strikes may apply CIL
directly to narrow the scope of such laws. At a minimum, state judges may
require their governments to identify the categories of public employees that are
exercising authority in the name of the state or are performing essential
services.334 After public employees or their representatives have been given a
chance to contest the contours of the government’s categories, state courts would
be in a position to rule on the scope of exceptions to the right to strike, and direct
that the right be available for all other public employees.
330. See, e.g., American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413-27 (2003); Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 435-41 (1968).
331. See, e.g., Bradford v. Director General of Railroads of Mexico, 278 S.W. 251, 252 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1925) (holding it would be contrary to law of nations to grant state trial court jurisdiction over
suit against railroad owned and operated by foreign sovereign); Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 83
N.E. 876, 877 (Mass. 1908) (dismissing personal injury damages action against railroad that is property
of foreign sovereign, based in part on principles of laws of nations); Hassard v. Mexico, 61 N.Y.S. 939,
939 (App. Div. N.Y. 1899) (dismissing lawsuit by bondholders against foreign government based on
“axiom of international law of long-established and general recognition” that a sovereign state cannot be
sued without its consent and permission”; see generally Ku, supra note 14, at 311-32.
332. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E. 2d 698, 700 (N.Y. 1969)
(relying on CIL to hold that property owned by foreign State and devoted to consular uses was exempt
from imposition of municipal real estate taxes); In re Caravas’ Estate, 250 P.2d 593, 596-97 (Cal. 1952)
(relying on principle of international law to hold that state probate code limitations provision was tolled
for period when existence of a state of war prevented Greek citizen and sole heir from having access to
the courts); Peters v. McKay, 238 P.2d 225, 230-32, 239-40 (Ore. 1951) (relying on The Paquete Habana
and CIL in holding that ten-year limitation in state escheat statute as applied to Dutch residents was
suspended by state of war). See generally Hon. Jack L. Landau, Customary International Law in State
Courts: A State Court Perspective, 20WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. &DISPUTERESOLUTION 48, 50-56 (2012).
333. Republic of Argentina, 250 N.E. 2d at 700.
334. See supra notes 58-71 and accompanying text (discussing scope of these exceptions under
international law).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has presented an ample basis for why the right to strike should
be regarded as customary international law. There is a rich breadth and depth of
support for the right, both as a general practice and a self-conscious legal
obligation. Support is evidenced through international human rights treaties;
regional instruments and court cases; domestic constitutional, legislative and
judicial decisions; and representations from governments and U.N. officials. Of
particular relevance, the right is established with sharp specificity regarding two
areas of divergence from U.S. law and practice: prohibiting the permanent
replacement of lawful strikers, and protecting the decision to strike for public
employees, with limited exceptions.
Application of CIL on behalf of U.S. workers in domestic courts faces
distinct challenges. The Article has examined these challenges and proposed
ways in which they may be countered if not overcome. In the short-term, the
challenges may seem too large in light of jurisdictional and procedural hurdles,
linked in many ways to the Supreme Court’s current reluctance to accept
international human rights law in a federal court setting.
Nonetheless, the exploration of this international right remains important
for a number of reasons. A common law right to strike may open doors to
litigation for public employees in states that are more hospitable to recognizing
CIL than the current majority of justices. The right also may have immediate
utility for American workers seeking a persuasive language in which to justify
their growing interest in strike activities. Further, given that the Court in its
relatively recent past has recognized the relevance of international human rights
law, there is reason to believe that it may do so again—in which case this in-
depth analysis of how one significant human right has been advanced and applied
in other countries may well be of value. Finally, arguments stemming from the
right to strike under international law are sure to have ongoing resonance beyond
U.S. borders, as the right continues to be developed and debated on the global
stage.
